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ABSTRACT

During the course of the Second World War, the United States and the United
Kingdom established a close working relationship on a number of official and unofficial
levels. Politicians and academics in both countries have described this closeness as a
“special relationship”. The purpose o f this study is to determine whether or not this
closeness survived the war and whether the Anglo-American relationship was truly
special.
To ascertain the answer to these questions two facets of the Anglo-American
relationship were examined. The first investigates the Anglo-American nuclear
relationship from 1939 to 1946. The second investigates the Anglo-American economic
relationship from 1939 to 1946.
In the sphere of nuclear relations, both the United States and the United Kingdom
contributed in scientifically significant ways to the construction of the first atomic bomb.
Both countries were partners in the Manhattan Project. The United Kingdom was the
first to do significant scientific research on the atomic bomb and was an extremely
important supplier of fissionable matter. The United States contributed the bulk of
material and technological work to the project.
In the sphere of economic relations the United States and the United Kingdom
began collaboration even before the American entry into the Second World War. A
system o f “Lend-Lease” flooded the United Kingdom with money and materials. Later
both sides agreed to a sweeping new vision of post-war economic order at the Bretton
Woods Conference.
It is suggested by this study that the Anglo-American wartime closeness was an
illusion. While high-level wartime agreements and assurances gave the impression that
postwar collaboration was very likely, in the aftermath of the war the United States and
the United Kingdom lost the very unity of interests that made wartime collaboration
possible.
Primary and secondary evidence suggests that the Anglo-American relationship
was not a “special” one, but a contentious relationship in which the interests of each side
contradicted the other.
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ATOMS, POUNDS AND POOR RELATIONS
THE ILLUSION OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
1941-1946

Britain has no permanent friends, only permanent interests. - Lord Palmerston1
Would a special relationship between the United States and the British Commonwealth be inconsistent with
our overriding loyalties to a world organization?
- Winston Churchill

A short time after Pearl Harbor, Winston Churchill traveled to the United States,
and stayed at the White House. Franklin Roosevelt, seeking to consult with Churchill,
was wheeled into his guest’s bedroom. At that moment, Churchill emerged from his
bathroom, wet and completely naked. Obviously embarrassed, Roosevelt prepared to
leave. Churchill, however, waved him back, and declared “The Prime Minister of Great
Britain has nothing to conceal from the President of the United States.”2
There is some question as to whether or not this actually occurred. Nonetheless
the story illustrated the profound change in the historical relationship between the United
States and Great Britain in the 1940’s. Previously, this relationship had been marked by
war, hostile diplomacy and even more hostile public opinion. For most o f the nineteenth
century, Anglophobia was rampant in the United States. British expansion, both

1 Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class And Nostalgia, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990) p. 102.
2 Ibid.. p .l.

2

commercial and territorial, was thought to be the greatest threat to American security, and
the legacy of two wars did nothing to engender American trust. On the other hand,
British leaders such as George Canning and Lord Palmerston opposed what they saw as
the greedy expansion of an unstable, moralizing and often hypocritical United States.
There was reconciliation in the late nineteenth century, but scholarly debate
ensued over how early and how heartfelt that reconciliation was. Historian Bradford
Perkins in The Great Rapprochement argued that reconciliation between the United
States and Great Britain was both earnest and widespread by the early twentieth century.
Edward Crapol in “From Anglophobia to Fragile Rapprochement: Anglo-American
Relations in the Early Twentieth Century,” from Confrontation and Cooperation:
Germany and the United States in the Era o f World War /, argued the opposite. Crapol
maintained that this reconciliation was neither earnest nor widespread, but instead was
,

.

.

.

quite fragile. This revisionist view of the Anglo-American partnership saw the alliance
of the First and Second World Wars as being built on a foundation of sand, not stone.
The Anglo-American relationship in the twentieth century has been the basis of
much scrutiny. The decline of the British Empire and the corresponding rise of the
United States in terms of military and economic power has provided scholars with an
interesting contrast.
The leap between a hostile relationship in which Neville Chamberlain consistently
turned down an American role in negotiating with Germany, to one in which the Prime

3 Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England And The United States, 1865-1914, (New York:
Atheneum, 1968); Edward Crapol, in “From Anglophobia to Fragile Rapprochement: Anglo-American

Minister could declare that he had nothing to hide from the President occurred
astonishingly fast.4 Was this new partnership in the twentieth century based on firm
footing, or merely a marriage of convenience?
Churchill coined the term “special relationship” in his famous Fulton, Missouri,
address. A quick perusal of historical literature pertaining to Anglo-American relations
since that time would find innumerable references to this term.5 The intrinsic problem
with the term “special relationship,” however, is that it is a slippery term. A large reason
is its inherent ambiguity: special in relation to what? In the 1940’s, this ambiguity did not
stop the diplomats and the academics from describing the relationship as such. Perhaps
more disconcerting was the non-exclusivity of the term. Historian David Reynolds noted
that academics have used then the term “special relationship” to describe the United
States’ relations with several countries including Israel, Brazil, West Germany and pre
communist China.6
The wartime partnership between the United States and Britain involved troops
fighting together, scientists researching together, and leaders planning together. A cogent
Relations in the Early Twentieth Century,” Confrontation And Cooperation: Germany And The United
States in the Era o f World War I, Ed. Hans-Juergen Schroder (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1993)
4 Patrick J. Hearden, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler, (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1987), p.99.
5 Peter Jones, America And The British Labour Party : The Special Relationship At Work , (New York:
I.B. Tauris, 1997); John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance : The Anglo-American Special
Relationship, 1940-57 (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1995); C.J. Bartlett, 'The special relationship' :
A Political History O f Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, (New York: Longman, 1992); Wm. Roger
Louis and Hedley Bull ed., The Special relationship : Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986) etc.
6 Ibid, p.4; Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978);
John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz, eds., Latin America, the United States and the inter-American system
(Boulder: Colorado: Westview, 1980); Hans w. Gatzke, Germany And The United States: a special
relationship? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); Michael H. Hunt, The making o f a
special relationship: The United States and China to 1914, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)
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definition o f a “special relationship” was difficult, due to the above-mentioned ambiguity.
However ambiguous the term, an attempt must be made to define the term “special
relationship.” The simplest way to define the “special relationship” was as a bilateral
relationship, unique in both the quality and quantity of its diplomatic, cultural and
economic ties. Bruce Russett saw a special relationship as originating in the wartime
identity o f interests. These mutual interests allegedly created a “We-feeling.” A true
“special relationship” would enable “trust, mutual consideration and the ability to treat
the other’s requests sympathetically.”7 This description may have been as exact as any
possible.8 Anglo-American relations during the Second World War were as close or
closer than any other bilateral relationship either country enjoyed during that time frame.
All o f Russett’s conditions were eminently applicable to the Anglo-American relationship
during the Second World War. Trust, mutual consideration and the ability to treat each
other’s requests sympathetically were seemingly a part of the Anglo-American
relationship. Thus, approximate continuation o f wartime cooperation into the post war
world would indicate a truly special relationship, independent of wartime expediency.
That said, the purpose of this study is not to determine the existence, duration, and
maintenance of this special relationship throughout the twentieth century. Rather, the
7 Bruce Russett, Community And Contention: Britain And America In The Twentieth Century, (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1963) p. 27.
8 Some authors have attempted to produce a more informal take on the “special relationship.” Nicholas
John Cull in Selling War describes the role that reporters, television and newspapers had in the formation of
the “we-feeling” and a “special relationship.” For a longer range view o f the Anglo-American relationship
consult Christopher Hitchen’s Blood, Class And Nostalgia, as well as David Reynolds and David
Dimbleby’s An Ocean Apart. Both books stress class and cultural connections as much as political
relations. Such a centuries-long survey is beyond the scope o f this study. None o f these books, with the
possible exception o f An Ocean Apart, satisfactorily defines “special relationship.” Nicholas John Cull,
Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American “Neutrality ’’ In World War II, (Oxford:
Oxford Press, 1995) Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class And Nostalgia, (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1990); David Reynolds and David Dimbleby, An Ocean Apart. The Relationship between Britain
And America In The Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1988)
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purpose o f this study is to ask the following questions: did Anglo-American closeness
survive the war? Was the relationship truly special? This study will show through the
selective use of primary and secondary documents that this chimera o f a special
relationship was the result of wartime expediency. In the near political vacuum o f the
immediate post-war world, the United States and Great Britain turned away, not toward
each other.
The story o f the Anglo-American relationship during the Second World War was
not one o f equals. It was obvious and accepted in virtually every quarter o f Great Britain
that the United States was the dominant partner. However, the true picture of Britain’s
political impotence remained shrouded in denial. Many in Britain preferred to see the
United Kingdom as possessing something intangible and irreplaceable, something that
would be invaluable to the United States: the seeming ingrained intelligence and
experience that came from running an empire. Harold Macmillan succinctly summed up
this philosophy in a 1943 analogy. “W e... are Greeks in this American Empire. “You
will find Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans- great big, vulgar, bustling
people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but
also more corrupt. We must run [the partnership] as the Greek slaves ran the operations
o f the Emperor Claudius.”9 British leaders found to their dismay, however that the
United States had no use for those kinds o f intangibles. The British found that Americans

9 David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill And The Wartime Anglo-America Alliance, 1939-1945: Towards
a New Synthesis” in The ‘Special Relationship, ’ Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull ed, (Oxford: Claredon
Press, 1986), p. 35 Hitchens, Blood, Class And N ostalgia, p.23.
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neither particularly thought of themselves as the reincarnation of the British Colonial
Empire, nor needed the expertise that came from running such an endeavor.
The other side of the common British post-war philosophy was that the United
States owed Britain a debt o f gratitude for the effort o f holding off Germany from 19391941, virtually alone. Even when the United States entered the war, Britain still bore the
brunt of Western combat. In 1942 and 1943, the number o f British divisions
encountering the enemy was 50% higher than the American divisions.10 While the
United States experienced a booming economy, Britain was being bombed and starved to
the brink. In addition to the expected gratitude, Britain hoped to parlay this sacrifice into
close post-war cooperation and aid. Again, British leaders misjudged the United States.
After putting twelve million men in uniform and sending billions of dollars of aid to its
allies, American leaders were not inclined to see themselves in debt to Great Britain.
The previous one hundred years had witnessed the relative decline o f Britain
versus the absolute rise o f the United States. In 1860, Great Britain produced 19.9% of
the world’s manufactured goods versus the United States’ 7.2%. By 1928, while Great
Britain’s Gross Domestic Product had increased ten-fold, its share of the world’s
manufactured goods had dropped to 9.9%, while the share produced by the United States
shot up to 39.3%.11 During the Second World War however, as Britain figuratively broke
up the furniture and threw it on the fire, the United States experienced an incredible
boom. This resulted in the absolute rise of the American economy and the absolute

10 Anglo-American Economic Collaboration edited by Sir Alec Caimcross, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1982) p. 24.
11 B.J.C. McKercher, Transition O f Power: B ritain’s Loss O f Global Preeminence To The United States,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999) p.3-4, 323.

decline of the British economy. It was later noted by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Foreign
Office permanent Undersecretary, that the longer the war wore on, the more the Big Three
looked like the Big Two and a Half.12 Great Britain was “Lepidus in the Triumvirate with
Marc Anthony and Augustus.”

1T

This problem of rapid decline versus rapid ascension

created a very real tension throughout the war, which was felt the most in the realm of
post-war planning. How could two countries plan effectively for the post-war world
when the positions that they found themselves in changed so rapidly?
However, the greatest barrier to a close post-war Anglo-American special
relationship was the miscommunication that emanated from the top echelon o f policy
makers, and indirectly, from the relationship between Winston Churchill and Franklin
Roosevelt.
The perceptual basis of a close Anglo-American relationship was the personal
relationship between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. Warren Kimball has
pointed out that if a search committee had chosen wartime leadership, Roosevelt and
Churchill’s applications would quickly have been slipped into a stack marked “Routine
Rejection.” Neither seemed to be eminently qualified to fight a war, let alone win one.
However, the common perception was that after Britain survived the Battle o f Britain,
and after the United States was bombed at Pearl Harbor, both leaders linked arms and
gloriously and inevitably led the alliance to victory. This fable masked the tension that
worked on the Anglo-American relationship throughout the war. This tension was

12 Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain And America, 1944-1947, (New York: Columbia
Press, 1981) p. 179.
13 Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, p. 183.

submerged, put off and papered over throughout the war, only to finally explode in a
cloud of recrimination at the end.14
It is true that Roosevelt and Churchill had a closer relationship than any President
and Prime Minister ever did. This close relationship, however, had a disadvantage in
post-war planning. Instead of relying on subordinates to hammer out defined and
absolute plans and policy, the two leaders often made policy informally. Rather than
going through official channels with a problem, Churchill often went directly to
Roosevelt. The problem with this approach in the realm o f post-war planning was that
Roosevelt did not enjoy post-war planning in the least. Roosevelt had a rather mercurial
personality, given to promising differing advocates o f an issue different things. He was
often given to making vague, broad promises about the post-war world. Sometimes this
caused Churchill and the British to read things into American promises that were not
quite there. Sometimes these promises were executive agreements, such as Roosevelt and
Churchill’s 1943 agreements at the Quebec Conference to continue Anglo-American
nuclear cooperation after the war. At other times they were oral promises by Roosevelt
to Churchill, such as Roosevelt’s promise to make $6.5 billion of Lend-Lease Phase II aid
available to the British. In either case, the death of Roosevelt and the replacement of
Churchill at the end o f the war left their successors with confusing, uncertain and often
contradictory plans. Similarly, Cabinet and bureaucratic level underlings were often left
without direction or with their own agendas. If a relationship is based on uncertainties,
assumptions and non-binding promises, is it special... and can it survive?

14 Warren F. Kimball, Forged In War: Roosevelt, Churchill And The Second World War, (New
York: William Morrow and Co., 1997) p. 1-5.
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The two most important areas o f Anglo-American post-war planning were in the
realms of nuclear planning and economics. On both these issues, hung the future power
of the United States and the future survival o f Great Britain. As the two most important
issues in the Anglo-American relationship, the quality and quantity of nuclear and
economic relations should be the determining factor as to whether the “special
relationship’5actually existed in the immediate post-war world. During the war, there was
an extraordinary level o f cooperation and exchange. A lack of “trust, mutual
consideration and the ability to treat the other’s requests sympathetically” in these two
realms of Anglo-American interaction after the war, however indicates that a “special
relationship” did not exist in that time period.15
The first chapter of this study looks at the Anglo-American nuclear relationship.
The British were the originators o f state-sponsored nuclear research. At the beginning of
the war, and well into 1942, the British led the United States in research on an atomic
bomb. By 1943, the United States had caught up and passed the British in research. At
this point Roosevelt and Churchill made a series of executive agreements that merged the
projects, and seemed to open the way for continued cooperation after the war. The
apparent cooperation between the Roosevelt and Churchill, however, masked dissention
in the opinions of their deputies and underlings. When both leaders left the scene, these
executive agreements would be called into question by their successors.
By the end of the war, questions about whether or not the United States would stay in
Europe after the war led many British leaders, most prominently Churchill, to see the
15 M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952 (London: St Martin's
Press, 1974)
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atomic bomb as the only way to protect British interests and maintain its status as a major
world player.
In the United States, the death o f Roosevelt in April 1945, led to the ascension of
Harry Truman, who had no clearly formed opinion on the future o f nuclear energy. For
this, the new president looked to his advisors for answers. Persons inside and outside the
cabinet, who wanted to keep the atomic bomb an American monopoly, largely influenced
Harry Truman. Individuals who advocated the internationalizing of the atomic bomb led
the opposition to this group of advisers. Neither group advocated a nuclear partnership
with Great Britain, or if aware of Roosevelt and Churchill’s wartime agreements, thought
themselves in any way bound by them
Churchill’s successor, Clement Attlee, who became the Prime Minister in July,
1945, lacked Churchill’s single-minded commitment to a close Anglo-American
partnership. Attlee and his advisors incongruously tried to have their cake and eat it too,
by striving for multi-national control of the bomb, while still trying to get the Americans
to honor Roosevelt and Churchill’s agreements of a close bilateral sharing of information
after the war. The ultimate result of this divergence of interests was the complete
freezing out o f Great Britain from post-war nuclear research. This led to the launching of
Great Britain’s own project and the accusations by both sides of untrustworthiness.
The second chapter o f this study examines the economic relationship between the
United States and Great Britain. During the war, Great Britain was unquestionably in the
fight of its life. In defeating the Nazis, Britain spent a full quarter of its national wealth,
and was in debt for nearly as much. Its horrible balance of payments ensured financial
ruin unless steps were taken to shore up the economy. Throughout the war, Britain

11

leaned heavily on the United States for aid, mainly through Lend-Lease which eventually
added up to a $20 billion unpaid receipt.16 Many American officials and diplomats were
eager to use this leverage to pry open Britain’s closed trading bloc, the Imperial
Preference System. It was thought by many that, only a post-war world with liberalized
trade and open markets for American goods would prevent the United States from sliding
into depression. During the war Roosevelt was characteristically eager to aid the British,
and uneager to worry about post-war plans. In this frame o f mind Roosevelt prevented
the State and Treasury Departments from placing concrete clauses in the Atlantic Charter
and the Lend-Lease agreement that would eliminate the preference system. Roosevelt
also fueled British hopes for extended American aid by seemingly agreeing to help
Britain reconstruct itself and promising aid that in reality only Congress could approve.
By the end of the war, the American lifeline o f aid was taken for granted by Britain. This
would throw Britain into panic once Truman, either not knowing or not caring about
Roosevelt’s informal promises, and as required by the Lend-Lease legislation, severed the
Lend-Lease link. After obtaining a conference on lend-lease and future aid, the British
were confident that they could easily obtain a large grant-in-aid for rebuilding. In the
resulting negotiations, the Americans, to the surprise of the British, played hardball
diplomacy in regards to post-war aid; demanding British trade concessions, refusing
grants in aid and demanding that any future aid should come in the form of interestbearing loans. Truman and his advisors were determined to create a liberal post-war
economic framework with the United States as the hegemonic power. A preferential

16 Richard Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and Prospects o f Our International Order,
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969) p. 208-209.
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partnership with Britain did not figure into the equation. Even though the final aid terms
were far from onerous, for a British government and people who believed that they had
contributed, as much, if not more, towards victory relative to the United States, the terms
were an outrage. To many in the United States, Britain’s ungrateful demeanor was a
collective slap in the face. There were more recriminations on both sides.
The transition from hostile feelings to close partners during the Second World
War was more illusion than reality. Both countries needed longer to digest the rapid pace
of events to create a true “special relationship.” An uncertain relationship was papered
over by the promises and agreements o f Roosevelt and Churchill. Without their steadying
hands, American avarice and British blunders led to mutual raw feelings. This being the
case, this study shows that contrary to the view of many historians, diplomats and leaders,
a “special relationship” did not exist between the United States and Great Britain in the
immediate aftermath o f the Second World War.

13

PARTI
THE PROBLEM OF ANGLO-AMERICAN NUCLEAR RELATIONS

14

The response to this greatest o f all triumphs o f scientific method and creative intelligence had been in some
respects closely akin to the practice o f magic among the most prim itive o f tribes. Having in their
possession a fearful image o f the god o f war, which makes them stronger than their enemies, the tribe is
obsessed with the fe a r that the image may be stolen or duplicated and their exclusive right to the Deities
fa vo r lost. So a temple is built, ringed around by walls and guarded by untiring sentinels. Those whose
function it is to attend the deity are carefully chosen and subjected to purification rights; they are
forbidden to ever look upon the whole image or speak o f what they have seen. They are guarded with
unceasing vigilance and at the slightest sign o f defection condign punishment is visited upon them.17

In the course of the Second World War, the United States and Great Britain were
perceived to be brothers at arms. With the threat of the two monstrosities of Nazi
Germany and Imperial Japan ever present, differences in opinion and inter-allied friction
were quieted and placated as best as possible. To many American leaders such as like
Franklin Roosevelt, the future of the alliance would work itself out in due course; in the
meantime Britain could be pacified, as needed, with vague promises and banalities. To
most Britons, especially Winston Churchill, their fate in a post-war world was an ever
present shadow that demanded concrete commitments and assurances.
17Margaret Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, p. 321.
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In many areas, these differing doctrines of inquiry and placation led to large scale
confusion and resentment after the war. Nuclear development was a prime example of
one of these areas. During the Second World War, both American and British scientists
worked on the Manhattan project in the quest for the atomic bomb. Following several
agreements and promises, the unprecedented nuclear partnership to all outward
appearances seemed destined to outlast the war. This nuclear partnership would seem to
have been a clear manifestation of the “special relationship” between the United States
and Great Britain. However, within a year of the first use of the atomic bomb on Japan,
the British had been completely excluded from American atomic research. Why was
atomic energy a main point of contention after the war? The problems in the AngloAmerican nuclear relationship were symptomatic of the British proclivity for pursuing a
course o f bilateral control with the United States, while they put their trust into the
informal promises of Franklin Roosevelt. The British government quickly found out that
the United States was interested in unilateral hegemony, and would soon neglect their
wartime promises. These incompatible elements prevented a “special relationship” in
Anglo-American nuclear relations.

16

Prelude

The foundations o f the atomic bomb flow through the history of physics. The first
real breakthrough towards the realization o f nuclear power came at a Swedish resort in
1938. Lise Meiter, a refugee, Austrian-Jew, with help from her partner Chemist Otto
Hahn, theorized that a neutron could split a nucleus. This was fission, the basis of the
atomic bomb. In theory, the split of the nucleus would release an enormous amount of
energy and an additional neutron. Her work was to influence a great deal of others,
including the legendary Danish physicist, and discoverer of the neutron, Niels Bohr.

1o

In 1939, Bohr reinforced Meitner’s theory by publishing the theory of uranium
nuclear fission. In this paper he laid out the foundation of nuclear energy.19 Recent work
by Enrico Fermi also pointed to similar conclusions. Two refugee scientists living in
England, Otto Frisch (who was Meitner’s nephew) and Rudolph Peierls, wrote a
memorandum showing how Uranium 235 could react violently to create a quick fission
capable o f releasing vast amounts of energy. A neutron splitting one atom could release
two other neutrons. These neutrons would split two more atoms and so on. This was
known as a chain reaction. The cumulative result would be the release o f an enormous
amount of energy. They specifically pointed out how a five-kilogram “super bomb”
could effect the same explosive force as several thousand pounds of dynamite.20 This
18 Richard Rhodes, The Making o f the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) p. 253-254
19 M. Gowing, “Britain, America And the Bomb” from British Foreign Policy, 1945-56., ed. John Young
and Michael Dockill (London: Macmillan, 1989) p. 32.
20 M. Gowing, Britain And Atomic Energy (London: Macmillan, 1964), Appendix 1 “The Frisch-Peierls
Memorandum”.
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memo had a great impact on the British government and quickly led to the forming o f the
Maud Committee.

91

The committee goal was to research the possibility of an atomic

bomb. They ran into one wall right away. Only .7% of uranium ore is the U235 isotope,
while 99.3% is the slower reacting U238 isotope. Separating the two seemed an
impossible task. This problem was solved when, with the fall o f France, two leading
French physicists fled to England. These two scientists had developed a method for
extracting U235 using uranium oxide and heavy water. 22 With them, they spirited away
50 gallons of heavy water in tin cans. These cans contained most of the world’s supply.

9T

This discovery put the British light years ahead in the nuclear race.
To most o f the physicists contemplating the creation o f a bomb, the most pressing
fear was that Germany would obtain the bomb before the Allies. This fear was
heightened in 1940, when Germany overran Norway. Norway was home to the only plant
in the world then equipped to produce heavy water. The fear was compounded by the fact
that the brilliant German physicist Wemer Heisenberg had been chosen to head the
German nuclear project.24 For most of the war, the Manhattan Project operated under the
assumption that the German project was proceeding at a similar pace. It was not until
Allied troops overran German research centers that American and British leaders realized
21 The name MAUD is not an acronym, but a reference to a telegram sent by Lise Meitner. The telegram
read “MET NIELS AND MARGRETHE RECENTLY BOTH WELL BUT UNHAPPY ABOUT EVENTS
PLEASE INFORM COCKCROFT AND MAUD RAY KENT.” Maud Ray Kent was taken to be an
anagram for “’’radium taken,” a reference to the German nuclear project. It was later that the committee
learned Maude Ray was a governess living in Kent who taught Bohr’s sons English. R. Rhodes, The
Making O f The Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) p. 362.
22 Heavy water is H 2 0 in which the hydrogen carries an extra neutron.
23 R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making O f The Hydrogen Bomb, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) p. 58.
24 War can lead to many incongruities. Heisenberg’s life was one o f them. He had been the star pupil o f
Niels Bohr, and a close friend to Enrico Fermi. The thought o f Heisenberg in charge o f the German atomic
project inspired terror in the hearts o f his former colleagues. Bohr, who was unbeknownst to most, halfJewish, refused to participate in the German project after Denmark was overrun and later, fled to America.
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that Germany had progressed very little since the beginning of the war. It turned out that
Hitler, despite his love of “secret weapons,” had never liked the idea of nuclear physics.
It seems that he was convinced that such scientific work such as Einstein’s theory of
relativity was “Jewish Physics.”

It was the fear of the German project that gave the

main impetus to build an Allied bomb. The United States and Britain would have
different luck with the Soviet Union in that regard.
By 1941, the MAUD Committee was able to show with good certainty that an
atomic bomb would work. Meanwhile physicists in the United States had not been idly
sitting on their hands. Refugee physicist Leo Szilard immediately saw the potential of a
bomb and persuaded Albert Einstein to write his now famous letter to Franklin Roosevelt
about it. Roosevelt’s reply to Einstein indicated that he had already set into motion what
would become the enormous $2 billion Manhattan project. The United States was still
neutral, and the research would not take on its extreme importance for a couple years.
After reading the MAUD report the Americans suddenly became interested in
collaboration, and in 1941 they proposed a jointly controlled project with the British. The
British treated this proposition condescendingly. At the time, they were confident of their
own ability to build a bomb alone, or in concert with Canada. Some distrust o f American
intentions and of American security contributed to this. The manifested problem was that
while the British had a plentiful supply o f theoretical physicists, they lacked the
engineering expertise and resources o f the United States.
Fermi had to flee Italy, to the United States, because o f fear for the safety o f his Jewish wife. Still,
Heisenberg was somehow able to rationalize his work for Nazi Germany.
25G. Hodgeson, The Colonel, (New York: Knopf, 1990) p.287.
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How would the war partnership have been if the British had accepted an American
partnership in 1941? It is impossible to know, although several British historians have
implied that the British could have arranged a more or less equal basis if they had jumped
on “the bus.”

<y zr

American historians tend to dismiss this view as overly optimistic. While

the British were reasonably forthright about sharing their theoretical research with
American scientists, American research was top secret. It was almost certainly clear to
Vannevar Bush: the director o f the Office of Scientific Research that the Americans
would certainly be able to catch up with whatever theoretical progression the British had
made, relatively quickly. Bush had a good reason to think that. In fact, a great bulk of
the theoretical work on nuclear fission could be read in numerous scientific journals.
Until the Manhattan project got under full swing, scientists had continued to publish their
work. Also, American production potential severely outdistanced Britain. Moreover, the
United States would inevitably have taken on the superior burden o f production and
demanded the superior return. There is no reason to believe that a partnership in 1941
would not have produced the same results as the future partnership did in 1943.

26 Margaret Gowing, the official historian o f Great Britain’s atomic project is the most prominent o f these.
M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952 (London: St Martin's
Press, 1974)
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The Partnership

By late 1942, the British realized the limitations of their program. They were
struggling to come up with a test unit; meanwhile the Americans had made a quantum
leap ahead in the nuclear development race. The Manhattan Project, headed by General
Leslie Groves and Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, was already underway. The decision to
build the bomb and the project that accompanied it was taken by Roosevelt alone.
Congress was not to be informed nor consulted in any way, shape, or form. The most
brilliant minds in the United States were sequestered for the atomic quest.
A convincing argument can be made that the Manhattan Project assembled the
greatest collection o f geniuses ever for a single project. Included among these were such
Nobel Laureates as Ernest Lawrence, Edward Teller, Enrico Fermi, and later Niels Bohr.
With them were hundreds of the country’s most accomplished scientists and engineers.
The project was split between two main centers and several smaller research points. The
site at Los Alamos, New Mexico would be the command facility where the actual atomic
bombs were invented and produced. The new top-secret facility being constructed at Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, was to produce the plutonium and uranium 235 for the bombs. Other
centers such as the University of Chicago and Columbia University would work on
smaller, related projects. Furthermore, unlike Britain, the United States Government put
the military in charge o f every aspect of the Manhattan Project. American scientists were
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to act as employees. The scientists were encouraged to think of themselves as fighting
the war much like the GIs in the field. Similarly though, the government did not solicit
strategic advice from regular grunts, neither did they ask scientists for their advice on the
strategies and uses of the bomb. The executive branch made policy, and the so-called
“Top Policy Group” would give advice. By early 1942, they had worked out a tentative
schedule for when the bomb would be ready. Vannevar Bush predicted an atomic bomb
by early 1945, despite the fact that it had yet to be conclusively proven, experimentally,
that a chain reaction was even possible.
The British scientists, meanwhile, ran their project themselves. It was they who
decided if the bomb should be built, and the ethics o f using it. As pioneering as they had
been in the formulation of nuclear physics and the theorizing of the atomic bomb, it soon
became clear that the besieged nation had not nearly enough resources to create the
nuclear bomb. Winston Churchill wrote to Franklin Roosevelt about sharing nuclear
information in late 1942. The President’s main scientific advisors, Bush and Harvard
president James Conant, dissuaded Roosevelt from sharing anything more than basic
scientific theories with the British. They reasoned that little would be gained by
collaborating with the British since the American program was so far ahead. At the same
time, sharing technical “know how” could be vulnerable to security breaches.
Furthermore, Secretary of War Henry Stimson pointed out that an agreement between the
British and Soviets to share information on all new weapons could threaten the security of

27 G. Hodgeson, The Colonel, p. 292-294.
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the project.

9R

As a further disincentive for cooperation, the United States brass did not

trust the Free French among the British contingent and also considered them a risk.

9Q

Roosevelt deferred to Churchill until 1943, where at Quebec he signed an
agreement that the British thought would bring them into a partnership with the
Americans. This led to the possibility of British participation in the American project and
to joint exploitation of uranium. The Quebec Agreement had four important provisions.
The first was that neither side would use the bomb against a third party without the
other’s consent. The second was a clause setting up the Combined Policy Committee to
coordinate and control the joint acquisition o f fissionable materials. The third provided
for the interchange of information relating to atomic energy, a provision at the discretion
of the United States and set to expire after victory was achieved. The fourth was that the
President o f the United States would dictate any post-war atomic collaboration of an
industrial or commercial character. Immediately afterwards, most of the British
physicists joined the Manhattan project in a limited role. The British no longer
maintained a native project, and had been decidedly placed in a junior partner status
compared to the United States. This agreement was followed later by a top secret AideMemoire between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at Hyde Park, New York on
September 18, 1944. This statement included the ambiguous provision that “Full
collaboration between the United States and British Government in developing [Atomic

28 G. Herken, “American Diplomacy And The Atomic Bomb, 1945-1947.” (Princeton, 1974) p. 6.
29 The American leadership was never to trust the French in any capacity, even after the war. However the
British as well actively supported concealing all nuclear information from French leaders after liberation,
even though the French had several patent claims relating to the atomic research. British leaders could have
later looked on this with irony when they were complaining o f U.S. officials o f having information withheld
from them, despite their contributions. “Minutes o f the January 22, 1945 Combined Policy Committee,”
Department o f State, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office 1967), 1945, II, 2-5.
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Energy] for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat o f Japan
unless and until terminated by joint agreement.” 30 The road to continued AngloAmerican cooperation seemed to run far past the war.

The Man behind the Curtain

Major General Leslie Groves was a formidable figure. As the head of the
Manhattan project, he made his reputation as a tough, secretive and jingoistic man. He
was always just out o f the public eye, but nonetheless always pulling the strings. Groves’
position as sole head of the Manhattan project gave him unprecedented influence with the
executive branch in the areas o f foreign policy. It was he to whom the President and
cabinet turned to for answers on the progress of the bomb. He in turn answered on all
things, only to the President and chief o f staff It was also Groves who dictated which
scientists worked on what, including British scientists as of 1943. This was a great deal
o f influence for a man who before the war had been a colonel in the Army Engineers. But
it was for his remarkable organizational skills that Groves was chosen to head one of the

30Department o f State, “Aide-Memoire on TUBE ALLOYS”, Foreign Relations O f The United States
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1944, Quebec Conference, 492-493.
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most significant undertakings in human history. He was not unaware o f his position or
his power, and definitely had a plan in mind on what to do with it.
Groves, however, did not consider himself constricted to planning only for the
war. As director, part o f his job was to acquire adequate uranium for the project. His
first concern was to obtain uranium that could otherwise fall in to the hands of the
Germans. But he was thinking past the war. Unlike other American leaders enamoured
by the Soviet Union during their brief partnership, Groves remained both hostile and
skeptical with regards to the Soviets. He also failed to see the role of the Manhattan
project as limited to making a small number o f bombs in order to defeat Japan. Instead,
he envisioned building up a massive industrial base, capable of turning out large numbers
o f atomic bombs after the war. In October 1945, Groves wrote a secret report that
concluded, “we [should] not permit any foreign power with which we are not firmly
allied, and in which we do not have absolute confidence, to make or possess atomic
weapons. If such an country started to make atomic weapons, we [should] destroy its
•

capacity to threaten us before it had progressed far enough to threaten us.”

^ 1

In other

words, Groves advocated a preemptive strike. The Soviet Union, being the only enemy
with the power and ideology to threaten the United States, was the most likely future
candidate for use of the proposed legions of bombs. Adequate uranium was the first step
towards this goal. In this role, he was soon to shape the pattern of American nuclear
policy.
31 R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making O f The Hydrogen Bomb, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) p.
224.
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Groves would not settle for just getting “adequate” uranium. His goal was nothing
less than the entire world supply o f high-grade uranium. His personal goal was to ensure
that the atomic bomb was solely an American monopoly, not only during, but also after
the war. As he articulated it, “insuring that the postwar position of the United States in
the field of atomic energy would not be unfavorable.”32 The most expedient way for
maintaining a monopoly o f atomic bombs after the war was for the United States to
maintain a monopoly over high-grade uranium. In his quest for an American monopoly
o f nuclear materials, Groves initiated a covert operation to identify and purchase uranium
ore around the world. It proved relatively successful. Taking into account that the only
previous use for uranium was as a dye, many neutral countries readily sold what they had.
This program was code-named Murray Hill Area and was directed personally by Groves.
In fact, he had such control over the finances that money for the program was channeled
directly into his personal bank account to avoid detection from spies, or for that matter,
Congress.

In that way, Groves was able to lock up a huge portion of uranium for

American use.
Groves had to contend with one major fly in the ointment. A significant portion
o f uranium was located within the British Commonwealth, making collaboration with the
British a requirement to obtain that material. This was accomplished by the Quebec
Agreement, which created the Combined Policy Committee to oversee purchase of
uranium from neutral countries. This committee was comprised o f three Americans, two
Britons and one Canadian. An offshoot of this was the Combined Development Trust.

32 L. Groves, Now It Can Be Told (New York: Harper & Row 1962), 285-6.
33 G. Herken, The Winning Weapon (New York: Knopf, 1981), p. 101.
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The Hyde Park “Agreement and Declaration of Trust” created the Trust. The Chairman
was, of course, Major General Leslie Groves.34 The purpose o f the Trust was to ensure
joint control o f uranium deposits under British dominion, but not yet in the stockpile of
the Manhattan project. Technically the Trust was supposed to work on a need basis
between the two countries. Of course during the war, only the United States actually
needed the uranium. Groves had great influence over the Combined Policy Committee as
well, even though he was not a member.
To Groves, the Anglo- American nuclear partnership was a marriage of
convenience destined to end after the war. However, the British were helping to bring in
a considerable amount of uranium and could not be ignored. In addition to their
resources in South Africa and India, the British had been critical in obtaining a lease on
S'

the uranium of the Belgian Congo/" In their uranium, the British had their only
bargaining chip. Leslie Groves wanted to change this. For Groves, the goal was an
American monopoly of uranium.

34 Department o f State, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1966), 1944, vol. II, p. 1026
35 R. Hewlett, A New World (College Park, 1962), p. 285.
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A Furnace for the Fuel

Leslie Groves’ goal was a monopoly of the atomic bomb after the war: a nuclear
Pax-Americana, or more precisely, a Hegemonie des Etats-Unis. There were two obvious
rivals who could challenge this. The most obvious and most threatening was the Soviet
Union. Groves did not have any real geographic evidence o f how much uranium the
USSR had, but he confidently told Harry Truman that it would take 20 years for the
Soviets to attain a Hiroshima type bomb.36 He reasoned that it would take that long for
the Soviets to develop uranium-refining techniques able to exploit the low-grade deposits
they had. Groves was confident that the Murray Hill Area project would capture all of the
world’s high-grade uranium.
The other nation was obviously Great Britain. The British were actively pursuing
nuclear information for both weapons and energy. The British had the uranium access to
build bombs or reactors. What they lacked was what became popularly known as
scientific “ know how.” More precisely, they lacked the actual engineering information
on how to build the bomb. Larger scale correlates to a higher complexity. A 12-year-old
could build a simple rocket capable of taking off. Yet, it took decades to build one
capable o f escaping the earth’s atmosphere. While the aeronautical theories for both
rockets are virtually the same; the engineering is staggeringly different. The same

36 In 1954, Groves admitted to a congressional committee that in his calculations, he had overlooked Soviet
access to uranium in Eastern Europe. The Soviets had detonated an atomic bomb in 1949, 16 years earlier
than Groves had predicted. G. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 341.
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correlation could be made between relatively small experiments involved in splitting
atoms, and the atomic bomb. The British already had the theoretical knowledge, but
having the theoretical knowledge did not correlate to having the skill and resources to
actually build a bomb. The British scientists working on the Manhattan project provided
theoretical and technical help, but were shut out o f much of the work on the more
sensitive engineering stages at Los Alamos.
In 1945, the problem at hand for new British Prime Minister Clement Attlee was that
the British had the “fuel but not the furnace.” The recent victory over Japan, under the terms
of the Quebec agreement, halted what little nuclear information they had been receiving,
since it was an exclusively wartime agreement. The recent death of Franklin Roosevelt and
the electoral defeat o f Winston Churchill left the Hyde Park Aide-Memoire in question.
With this, both the United States and Britain were in a bind. The British wanted the Hyde
Park “full post-war collaboration “ clause revalidated. Without this insurance, they could
not count on American nuclear information. The Quebec Agreement put the fate o f their
post-war program in the hands of Harry Truman. On the other hand, the Americans led by
Groves wanted to continue their grip on the Combined Development Trust.
The Quebec agreement, however, had a very worrisome stipulation for the United
States. The United States was bound to consult with Britain and Canada before using an
atomic bomb. This would have been politically embarrassing to Harry Truman had it
come to the attention of the public. So the United States’ conundrum was how to
maintain a monopoly of nuclear information and uranium while changing the consultation

29

clause.

77

It was clear to both sides that the Quebec Agreement would have to be re

negotiated.

The Cabinet Divided

As Truman came into the Presidency, his opinions on the nuclear bomb were still
rather malleable. He relied mostly on his advisors to show him the path to follow. These
advisors could be divided into two categories, monopolists and internationalists. While
monopolists saw the atomic miracle as being solely an American responsibility, and to
many a diplomatic lever, the internationalists believed that hoarding the atom was futile.
The internationalists reasoned that it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union
and others learned the secret. It was the duty o f the United States to see that it came
under the responsible control of the world. The monopolists were strong proponents of a
strong unilateral role for the United States in the post-war world. The internationalists
believed that the bomb, and the United States, belonged in a strong multilateral
framework. In the monopolist wing, Leslie Groves was the strongest force, yet however
strong his ambition and personality, he would not be able to get his way without an ally
close to the President. Groves found his ally in Secretary of State James Byrnes. The
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and Vannevar Bush led the internationalists. Despite

37 “Memorandum by the director o f the Office o f Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the
Secretary o f State” Department o f State, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1967), 1945, Vol. II, 69-70.
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agreeing in the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima, Byrnes and Stimson soon came to
believe in opposite uses for the bomb.
James “Jimmy” Byrnes had almost become President. The son of Irish
immigrants, James Byrnes was an ambitious young lawyer when he was elected to the
United States House o f Representatives in 1910. From there, he moved across the
Capitol Building to the senate in 1930. In 1941, Byrnes was appointed to the Supreme
Court. He left the bench shortly after war broke out to become head of the Office of
Economic Stabilization. He later became director o f the war mobilization effort, where
Roosevelt described him as an assistant president for the home front. Many expected him
to be tapped as Roosevelt’s running mate in 1944. Roosevelt however passed him over
for both Vice President, and Secretary of State.

Byrnes was a smooth talking old

fashion fixer. One Congressman noted “When I see Jimmy Byrnes coming, I put one
hand on my watch, the other on my wallet, and wish to goodness I knew how to protect
my conscience.”39
When Truman appointed him to be his first secretary of state, Byrnes was
determined to fix the international sphere, just as he believed he had repaired the
domestic one. He was a great believer in forceful individual diplomacy, but early on the
Soviets seemed rather intransigent on issues such as Eastern Europe. The problem State
Department diplomat George Kennan noted with Byrnes was that he tended to play
negotiations by ear, without any set plan or agenda. Kennan’s colleague, Charles Bohlen,

38 Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain And The Cold War, 1944-1947, (Columbia:
University o f Missouri Press, 1981) p. 88.
39 Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain And America, 1944-1947, (New York: Columbia
Press, 1981) p. 149.
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explained Byrnes’ problems dealing with the Soviets as a matter o f perspective. Byrnes
had dealt with Congress where compromises worked because everyone played in the
same system by the same rules, something Byrnes found absent in foreign affairs.40 Thus,
the atomic bomb seemed a blessing for Byrnes. He was tired of haggling over everything
with the Soviet Union and getting nowhere. He was convinced that the atomic bomb
could prod the Soviets in directions that they would not otherwise go. Groves’ rosy
predictions of future American monopoly o f the bomb made Byrnes eager to try his hand
at nuclear diplomacy. Byrnes was not alone in this belief in the efficacy o f atomic
diplomacy. Stimson and Truman also thought early on that the bomb could be a concrete
lever in persuading the Soviets to democratize Eastern Europe, and possibly initiate
internal reforms within the Soviet Union. It was nai’ve to think that Stalin would accept
internal reforms pushed on him by the Americans, after sacrificing almost 20 million
Soviet civilians in fighting Germany. No matter how powerful he thought the bomb was,
Stalin surely did not think it would be any more destructive than the Nazi invasion. In
spite of this, Jimmy Byrnes thought that with an extended American atomic monopoly the
Soviets would see things in a different light.41
The venerable, outgoing Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, led the
internationalists. The old New Yorker’s political life had spanned the entirety of the first
half o f the twentieth century. Stimson was a confidant and friend to Teddy Roosevelt.
He had served as Secretary o f War to Taft, Governor General to the Philippines under

40 Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain And The Cold War,1944-1947, (Columbia:
University o f Missouri Press, 1981) p. 89, George Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, (Boston: Little, Brown,
1967) p 287-288.
41 Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 32
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Coolidge, and Secretary of State to Hoover. Stimson was unarguably the most respected
cabinet member.42
Stimson, like many, was a monopolist in the immediate aftermath o f the war.
However, his opinion changed after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed. In today’s
light, Stimson could be seen as somewhat of an oracle relating to the atomic bomb. In a
letter to Truman, he not only predicted the arms race between the United States and the
Soviet Union, but also predicted that the Soviets could get an atomic bomb by 1949.
Stimson had been among the first to advocate the use of the atomic bomb as a diplomatic
lever. He soon came to reconsider his position. He likened the bomb to a “royal flush,”
and that the United States had been “too lavish with our beneficence upon [Russia].”43
After a few weeks, Stimson began to see the atomic bomb as something apart than just a
greater conventional weapon. He likened it to man harnessing the heart of nature itself.
The impression of Byrnes swaggering around with a “bomb in his pocket” disturbed him.
Still, Stimson was ardently anti-Communist and fervently believed that the Soviet Union
was an amoral dictatorship. He personally grappled with how it would be possible to
move the Soviet Union in the direction o f freedom. After some personal reflection, his
conclusion was astonishing. He decided to advocate the use o f the atomic bomb, not by
dropping it, but by sharing it. He pointed out that Britain was already a partner of sorts.
He predicted, “Unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership, we would
maintain an Anglo-American bloc over against the Soviet.” He predicted that the result
would be “a secret armaments race of a rather desperate character.” “If we feel, as I
42 G. Hodgeson, The Colonel, p. 358.
43 Ibid.. p. 347.
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assume we must, that civilization demands that some day we arrive at a satisfactory
international arrangement respecting the control o f this new force, the question then is
how long we can afford our momentary superiority.”44
Stimson proposed that the United States should, along with Britain, offer to the
Soviet Union entree into a collaborative effort that would limit the use of the atomic
bomb in war, and encourage the use o f peaceful atomic power. One o f Stimson’s favorite
sayings was that the only way to get a trustworthy man, was to trust him. He seemed to
be carrying this point to the Soviet Union. Unlike Byrnes and Groves, he thought that the
Soviets would only respond positively to trust and not threats. In a candid meeting with
Truman on September 4, 1945, Stimson told the President that there were risks in both
his and Byrnes’s plans. He concluded though, that “in my method there was less danger
than in his and also we would be on the right path towards... international world, whereas
with his we would be on the wrong path in that respect and tending to revert into power
politics.” He advocated eventually setting up an international commission, possibly
under the new United Nations, to control nuclear information. Incoming Secretary of
War Robert Patterson and Vannevar Bush backed up Stimson in these opinions.45 Bush,
alluding to the analogy that the atomic bomb was the gun on Byrnes’s hip, warned
Truman “there is no powder in the gun, for it could not be drawn, and this is certainty
known.”46 The inherent problem was the fact that Stimson was 78 and retiring. Plus it
was Byrnes, not Stimson, whose job it was to make foreign policy. Stimson led the

44 Ibid., p 356-58.
45 Department o f State, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967), 1945, vol. II, pg. 11 and 41.
46 G. Hodgeson, The Colonel, p. 355.
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organization that was responsible for building the bomb; Byrnes would decide how to use
it diplomatically with regard to the Soviets.

The Problem with Harry

It was not clear what Franklin Roosevelt’s plans were for post-war AngloAmerican cooperation. He left little to no notes or instructions; FDR was
characteristically secretive about it. As usual, many of Roosevelt’s guarantees to the
British were executive agreements, such as the Hyde Park Agreement. These pacts did
not necessarily apply to Harry Truman and he was not obligated to honor them. A
suitable bad omen for the British was that a filing clerk in the United States mistook the
British code word for the nuclear project, Tube Alloys, on the Hyde Park agreement, as
having something to do with torpedoes. The agreement was promptly misfiled. The
British would later have to convince Truman with their copy of the document.47
Truman himself never seemed to fully understand the consequences of his actions,
or the importance of the various agreements and uranium supplies. For this he leaned

47 The misfiled Hyde Park agreement would not be found until 1952. The only Americans to know about
the agreement at the Washington Conference would be Leslie Groves and Vannevar Bush, neither o f whom
were exactly British allies. There was suspicion that Groves had a copy which he did not share with
Truman. G. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 62.
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heavily on Byrnes and Groves. He saw Stimson’s point of the altruistic merit of a world
bettered by nuclear energy. Truman also saw effective international control as the safest
way to protect the world. But the international control of Stimson’s plan would involve
the blatant giving away o f the secret to the Soviet Union. Every one o f Truman’s
political instincts called out against giving the bomb to the Russians. Truman wanted to
believe that they might never get the bomb, or they would not get it for many years.
Groves and Byrnes’s counsel was simply easier to follow. First and foremost, Harry
Truman had always been a politician. He sensed correctly that the American people were
in no mood to give away their hard-eamed wonder. In addition, Truman wanted to
believe Byrnes in that the atomic bomb could be used as the ultimate diplomatic card. He
decided to take the diplomatic offensive against the Soviets.
The first atomic explosion at Alamogordo coincided with the Potsdam peace
talks. Truman was given the news on the morning o f July 21. Truman took the
opportunity to play nuclear diplomacy for first time in history. He approached Stalin and
warned him that the United States possessed a weapon of unusual and destructive force.
Instead of inquiring further, Stalin simply responded that he hoped the United States
would make good use of it.

This was taken by many o f Truman’s senior advisors to

mean that Stalin was underestimating the bomb. The truth o f it was, that because of spies
within the Manhattan project, Stalin had known of the bom b’s existence and potential
long before Truman. The Soviets were well underway with their own bomb program.
After the bombs were finally dropped, many expected the Soviets to become far less

48 G. Hodgson, The Colonel, p.335.
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intractable in negotiations. In the immediate aftermath o f Hiroshima, it seemed like they
had. When the United States did not include the Soviets in the occupational forces of
Japan, after some expected noise and protestations, Stalin acquiesced. When Truman
pressured the Soviets to give Manchuria to Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists, they agreed.49
There was a seemingly new forcefulness in American diplomacy because of the
bomb. By the same token, the Soviets appeared to become less obstinate in their
demands. To Washington, it seemed that the Soviets were genuinely afraid of the
bomb.50 This early test seemed to confirm the merits o f an atomic monopoly. If the
international community controlled the bomb, the Soviets would be less afraid of The
United States, and thus less willing compromise on issues. Or that is what the logic of
the situation seemed to dictate. Thus Harry Truman decided from early on that the United
States must be the only nation to possess the bomb. Thanks to Groves’ predictions,
Truman thought that it would maintain status quo for a long time. A victory for the
monopolists would necessarily be a defeat for the British. Thus after the war, the British
were operating at a distinct disadvantage.

49 G. Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy, (New York: Penguin, 1985) p. 240-242.
50 The likely reality is logic. Stalin believed that immediate conventional strength was paramount. His
concessions were made in East Asia, where America outnumbered the Soviets
in troops, not to mention had overwhelming air and sea power. Stalin, always a very calculating man, likely
thought it was unwise to challenge America at its point o f strength.
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The Internationalist Monopolist

Winston Churchill was always full o f nostalgia for the old empire. He often chose
to see the United States as a trusted partner that valued British friendship, a point of view
that was often facilitated by Roosevelt’s flattery. Churchill was no innocent though. He
knew that to survive as a world player, Great Britain would have to maintain very close
ties with the United States. Churchill desperately wanted to see the agreements with the
United States as a binding prelude to a lasting partnership. Unfortunately most of the
agreements Churchill had made were ambiguous at best. The Hyde Park agreement was
a good example o f this, a secret executive agreement with little to no contractual
obligation after Roosevelt’s presidency. But through all his romantic failings and
ambiguous deals, Churchill knew what he wanted. A secret, non-binding agreement or
not, the Hyde Park Aide-Memoire was a concerted effort by Churchill to gain British
access to nuclear information after the war. After victory, his most consistent and
pressing goal was to deliver the bomb to Britain. Churchill understood the magnitude of
the bomb from the beginning. He also pragmatically understood that there was no
guarantee that the United States would not retreat into isolation after the war, leaving
Britain potentially standing alone against the Soviet colossus. Churchill rationalized that
the only tool the depleted Britain would be able to use to keep a reasonable balance of
power was the bomb. However, few in the administration of Harry Truman were overly
sensitive about Britain’s postwar ambitions. There was an abundance o f realists and a
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number of anglophobes among them. Churchill was well aware o f this, and pressed
Truman for greater involvement. He and his advisors also believed that an enduring
nuclear bond with the United States would make it harder for it to recede into the
isolation Britain feared.51
In Churchill’s wartime coalition government, his Deputy Prime Minister was the
leader of the Labour party, Clement Attlee. Like Roosevelt with his Vice-Presidents,
Churchill never informed Attlee of the making o f the atomic bomb during the war years.
This was to have unfavorable results for the British. Though Churchill won the war, the
British public felt that Labour could better win the peace. In the summer o f 1945 Labour,
led by Attlee, defeated Churchill and the Conservatives. Only then did Churchill inform
Attlee. This change o f governments threatened to alter government policy towards
nuclear energy. Churchill was, above all, an unequivocal non-believer in international
control. His position was that Britain would be best served by a mutual pact with the
United States, perhaps including Canada. Attlee muddied the waters. It was obvious that
the destructive force unleashed upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki awed him. After the
dropping of the bombs he sent a telegram to Truman outlining his views. He saw the
atomic bomb as fundamentally changing the face of war forever. He stated in the
telegram that the “framework of which was erected at [the conference creating the United
Nations in] San Francisco must be carried much further if it is to be an effective shelter
for humanity.” Clement Attlee therefore started out as a nuclear internationalist. In
Attlee’s letter to Truman, he also suggested a conference on the international control of

51 Jerry Brookshire, Clement Attlee, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) p. 1995-196.
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nuclear energy with both him and the Prime Minister of Canada, Mackenzie King.
Truman agreed to a tripartite conference at Washington DC from November 10-16.52

Preparing for the Conference

Before leaving for the conference, Attlee circulated a memorandum to his cabinet,
summarizing his position on the future o f British nuclear research. The memorandum
provided a remarkable picture o f Attlee, who seemed to have blended idealism, realism
and naivete. He started with a general thesis, which contained the rather curious logic:
that since nuclear war can only lead to mutual destruction, “It is therefore that the
powerful nations o f the world should plainly recognize this fact and abandon all out-ofdate ideas o f power politics.”

This was a particularly naive general thesis to use. The

United States counted on power politics to remain the lingua franca o f diplomacy,
obviously to its tremendous advantage. Attlee built upon this general thesis in his further
points of the memorandum. In pronouncing power politics dead, Attlee assumed that the
United Nations would be a very powerful force in the future. This, o f course, was not to

52 Department o f State, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967), 1945, vol. II, p. 59.
53 Foreign Office Records, [C.P. (45) 272], Annex A, Nov 5, 1945
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be true either. So through the points o f the memorandum, Attlee suggested ways to make
civilization safe from the bomb, all o f which were based on an underestimation of the life
span of power politics and an overestimation of the future power of the United Nations.
Most surprising of all, was that Attlee, after all his points of international control and
safeguarding man-kind, stated that he would ask the President to continue the bilateral
cooperation set up by the Quebec Agreement while having Clause 4 removed. Attlee was
caught in the paradox of propagating an effective world government, and at the same time
trying to obtain as big a piece of the nuclear pie as possible for Britain.54
Churchill recognized this problem, and in a letter to Attlee recommended
abandoning thoughts of international control in order to strengthen Britain’s relationship
with the U.S. “I should regret if we seemed not to value this and pressed them to meld
our dual agreement down into a general international agreement consisting, I fear, of
pious empty phrases and undertakings.. .which will not be carried out.”55 Clement
Attlee’s paradoxical priorities would not help the already tenuous British cause.

54 Ibid.. Annex C,D
55 M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, p. 66.

41

A Talk on the Potomac

The Washington Conference was to have a two pronged approach: the diplomatic
pleasantries of the three leaders, and the real negotiating done by their subordinates. The
physicist Sir John Anderson and Field Marshall Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, both member
o f the Combined Policy Committee, led the British negotiators. Byrnes, Groves, Bush
and Patterson led the American negotiators.
The first British draft o f an agreement echoed most of the sentiments Attlee
displayed in his general thesis. Many of clauses were ones the United States could not
possibly agree to. Clause 5 and 6 proposed that a system of scientific visitation to nuclear
facilities by various nations be set up under the United Nations. Clause 7 also stated that
allocation o f fissionable materials should be put in the hands of the UN.56 That it would
be easier to make the United States a colony again, than to get the American negotiators
to agree to those clauses never seemed to cross the British delegation’s mind. The United
States simply would never agree to those conditions. The next three British drafts were
similar but tended to have more watered down language. Clearly, this was the effect of
American displeasure with the specific proposals the British had brought to the table.
The first American draft o f an agreement was a different animal altogether than
the British proposals. The agreement was filled with lofty language and no specific
proposals. What action the agreement provided was connected to the draft Clause 5,

56 Foreign Office Records, [C.P. (45) 272], Annex D, Nov 5, 1945
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which weakly recommended setting up a commission to make a recommendation to the
United Nations for atomic control. This was hardly an adventurous plan. On November
14, the British and American delegations at last agreed on a final draft. The agreement
looked definitively American. Clause 4 affirmed the both countries were willing to share
basic scientific research. The very next clause admitted that the basic scientific
knowledge of atomic energy was already available to almost anyone. In its treatment of
the exchange of technical information, the agreement stated that giving away engineering
and technical data would have a counter-productive effect the problem of the atomic
bomb. “We are, however, prepared to share, on a reciprocal basis with others of the
United Nations, detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of
atomic energy just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for
destructive purposes can be devised.”

What possible safeguards the agreement referred

to were not revealed or explained. The result o f all the discussion was an informal, non
binding agreement with no real suggestions for dealing with the international control of
nuclear energy.

The Heart of the Matter

While the full delegations had been hammering out the meaningless detail of the
tripartite agreement, another group was at work. Truman and Attlee had agreed that

57 Foreign Office Records, [C.P. (45) 272], Annex M, Nov 5, 1945

43

Anderson and R.M. Makins would meet with the new Secretary o f War, Judge Patterson,
and Groves to concentrate on the atomic relations between the two nations. The main
business was to provide a replacement to the Quebec Agreement. Vannevar Bush, before
the conference, had recommended a plan to eliminate all political provisions from the
Quebec Agreement in exchange for continued American control o f the Combined Policy
Committee. In this way, the United States could retain a monopoly on fissionable
material. He proposed that the Combined Policy Committee should work out the
dissemination o f information later.58 The United States could keep materials coming in,
and eliminate the clause, which required them to consult with the British before using the
bomb. The British agreed to this, thus voiding the embarrassing provisions in the Quebec
Agreement for both nations. Anderson remarked to Patterson that they were anxious to
start building pilot plants and wanted to know where the matter o f commercial rights
stood. Anderson got right to the heart of the matter and asked for continuing scientific
collaboration, including technical “know-how.” Patterson assured him that a solution
would found that would not place the UK at a disadvantage. Instead of pressing him on
that vague assurance, the British found the reply totally acceptable.59
However, the British wanted the United States to agree to something on paper
about the continuation o f scientific collaboration. The final agreement had seemingly
very resolute and binding language: First that the Combined Policy Committee and
Combined Policy Trust remain as they were. Thus Groves was assured of continued

58 Department o f States, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967), 1945, vol. II, pg. 70-74.
59 Ibid,, pg. 65-66.
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control of the uranium. The second part was a seeming concession to the British. The
United States proposed a statement to the effect that there would be “ .. .full cooperation
in the field o f atomic energy...” The British demanded the insertion o f the word
“effective” into the provision. After some wrangling, the United States agreed. The
agreement was known as the “Groves-Anderson Memorandum.” The resulting agreement
sounded concrete, but actually was a masterpiece of ambiguity. At the beginning, it was
decided that the agreement would be an informal one. A formal treaty would have
constitutionally necessitated a vote from the Senate, which neither party was eager to
have involved. In other words, even though both the President and the Prime Minister
signed the agreement, it was not a legal binding document. It was nearly as enforceable
as a gentleman’s handshake. Clement Attlee boarded a train for Ottawa the night of
tV>

November 14 , confident that he had solved the problem of Anglo-American
collaboration. That confidence was to be short lived. 60

60 M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952
(London, 1974) p. 85-86.
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O f Spies and M en

After the atomic bomb had been revealed to the American people, Congress
immediately took an interest in it. Truman had pledged to the American people that he
would submit a plan to Congress for the domestic control of energy. The question was
who was to control the atomic bomb and nuclear energy? At the time, Leslie Groves and
the military were in possession of it. In a meeting in late September o f 1945, Truman had
suggested that the Manhattan Project’s military oversight be continued in peacetime.61
The administration submitted a domestic atomic energy bill, the May-Johnson bill, which
recommended the continued control o f the nuclear energy program by the military. The
Manhattan project scientists, who streamed down from their ivory towers to lobby against
it, fiercely opposed this bill. Many scientists, who had worked on the bomb, were
horrified after its actual use. They felt that continued military control over the atomic
bomb could induce the United States into its further use. In reaction to this protest,
Senator Brian MacMahon, the head o f the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, opened
hearings on a rival bill. This enabled scientists to air their fears at the possibility of the
establishment o f a “military state” through the bill. MacMahon submitted a rival bill
providing civilian control of nuclear energy. To investigate the feasibility of the bill,

61 T. Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, (New York: Crowell, 1954) p.288.
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McMahon’s committee delved into the secret o f the development o f the atomic bomb.
The senator requested that Groves provide him with the details of the administration and
making o f the atomic bomb. Groves categorically refused, in order to protect the secret
o f the Combined Development Trust. His refusal won over many in Congress to support
the opposing MacMahon bill. Public opinion stood with the MacMahon bill as well.
This dissolved over night with the disclosure o f a Soviet spy ring working in Canada, in
February 1946.62
The spies received an amount o f high-grade uranium ore from British scientist
Alan Nunn May. In reality, the spy case was actually relatively minor, and would be
overshadowed several years later with the disclosure o f Soviet spies working in the
Manhattan project. But, by 1945 only the Alan Nunn May ring had been discovered, thus
casting a shadow over British security measures.
The May case went public and quickly public opinion turned away from civilian control.
Columnist Frank McNaughton broke the story citing a “confidential source” that told him
the spies were targeting scientists in the United States. This “source,” it was learned
years later, was none other then Major General Leslie Groves.
Meanwhile, Groves had every reason to provoke a public suspicion o f scientific
control o f the bomb.64 The spy scare was used effectively by the congressional
proponents of the May-Johnson act and military control. The spy scandal, provoked by
Groves, subsequently initiated the transmutation of the MacMahon bill. To guard against

62 G. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 121-122.
63 R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making O f The Hydrogen Bomb, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1995) p.
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64 G. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 130-131.
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atomic spies, the bill was amended in Congress, to make providing any other nation with
classified nuclear information a federal crime punishable by prison time.65 The
transformed bill looked little like the original. Along with this spy clause, the military
was given a seat on the new Atomic Energy Commission.

Thus the atomic bomb was

not put entirely into civilian hands as the original McMahon bill called for. The Atomic
Energy Act, as it was called, was passed in the summer of 1946. Groves sacrificed total
military control, but preserved the monopoly. The United States’ informal agreement
with Great Britain on scientific exchange was never discussed. The window of scientific
collaboration had seemingly closed.

The End of the Road

The British meanwhile, were quickly getting anxious about the ambiguity of the
“Groves-Anderson memorandum.” As a test of the American willingness to exchange
information, the British announced at the February 1946 Combined Policy Committee
meeting that they intended to build a plant to produce plutonium in Britain. They
65 This penalty was later substantially increased to capital punishment. It was under this act, that Julius and
Ethel Rosenburg were executed in 1953.

66 G. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 149.
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requested that Groves provide the details o f some American facilities. Groves denied the
request on the grounds that plants in Britain were insecure. The British angrily protested
and at the April 1946 meeting o f the Combined Policy Committee demanded a firm and
real agreement on scientific exchange.

What the American delegation gave them was in

effect, a knockout blow to their hopes of getting the technical secrets o f the bomb.
Appropriately enough, Major General Leslie Groves orchestrated it. Groves pointed out
that Clause 102 o f the United Nations Charter, to which both countries had signed,
required the registration of all treaties.68 Since both the United States and Great Britain
had publicly declared their supposed support for international control o f nuclear energy, it
would be diplomatically impossible to register a bilateral agreement on the exchange of
information. Attlee frantically telegraphed Truman reminding him that he had promised
“full and effective collaboration.” Truman responded that the language “full and
effective cooperation” was very general, and had not obligated the United States to aid
the British nuclear program. The British were incredulous. And if this American
maneuver was the knockout, the deathblow was the passage o f the Atomic Energy Act.
Cooperation between the United Sates and Great Britain was now both diplomatically
embarrassing and legally impossible.69
The Atomic Energy Act of course did not affect the Combined Development
Trust. Uranium ore was still being shipped to the United States from the British
Commonwealth and dominions. Ore was Britain’s last trump card, and they had waited

67 M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, p. 98-99.
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far too long to throw it down. The Combined Development Trust had been arranged on a
need basis. The need for uranium had always been America’s. The British, angered by
what they considered a betrayal, demanded half of all the uranium delivered to the trust
since the end of the war; Groves categorically refused. The British proposed a
compromise that all further material acquired from the Belgium Congo would be split
50:50 between the two countries; Groves opposed this as well. In the final act, British
Ambassador Lord Halifax delivered a note to the United States, which stated that if the
compromise were not accepted within five days, the British government would cease all
shipments of ore to the United States. The compromise was finally accepted. The
Combined Development Trust was thus kept intact and split between the two countries
until the United States abandoned it in 195-1. The Atomic Energy Act ended scientific
collaboration between the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

The End of the Beginning

The nuclear diplomacy o f Jimmy Byrnes lasted for little more than a year. When in
December 1945, the Allied foreign ministers met in Moscow to work out the problems of
Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Byrnes and other Americans entered the summit with
the faulty assumption that the Soviets would be intimidated by the atomic bomb. The
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time had come for a test of strength. Byrnes was more than ready to try his hand at
atomic diplomacy. After a talk with him, Stimson said Byrnes’ “mind is full of problems
with the coming meeting of foreign ministers and he looks to having the presence of the
•

*

•

bomb m his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon to get through the thing.”

70

Things

would not work out that way. Byrnes came to the conference, by all accounts, very sure
of himself. Unfortunately for him, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov was to
remain absolutely firm. Stalin was not about to give up his Eastern European buffer
states.
Stimson still sustained his confidence in the bomb; this much was painfully clear
to his colleagues at the conference. Unwittingly paraphrasing Stimson, Molotov asked
Byrnes if he had “an atomic bomb in his side pocket” during a conference reception.
Byrnes joked back to him that “if you don’t cut out all this stalling and let us get down to
work, I’m going to pull an atomic bomb out of my hip pocket and let you have it.”

71

The

comment was meant as a joke, but the underlying message was clear. The problem was
that this implied threat meant nothing. The value of the bomb as a bargaining counter lay
in its understated presence at the negotiating table. Byrnes never articulated just how this
•

understated threat would affect or sway the Soviets.

79

The reality was that in the final analysis, it did not matter. Molotov used the
conference to call the United State’s implied bluff. He continued to stall on the matters
o f Eastern Europe, and eventually derailed the conference. It became painfully obvious
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that simply having the bomb could not sway or intimidate the Soviets. Some of the
reasons were obvious. First, Stalin was willing to bet that the United States lacked the
will or the ruthless nature to drop atomic bombs on its erstwhile ally over the freedom of
Eastern Europe. This was the very thing that the threat o f the atomic bomb had to rest
on. Secondly, the Soviets knew that while powerful, the few bombs the United States
had, could not compensate for the fact that the Soviets still had over 150 divisions of
battle tested troops in Europe. Dropping a bomb on Moscow would not have changed
the military reality in Europe. Finally, what Truman and Byrnes did not know was that
the Soviets were well on their way to developing their first bomb.73 In short, the attempt
o f Byrnes to use the atomic bomb, as a diplomatic lever was ill conceived and poorly
thought out.
The undertaking, however, was understandable. The atomic bomb seemed at first
to be an almost magical weapon, and the country’s leaders treated it as such until they
were brought back to reality. Byrnes alienated many in his own agency, by keeping them
almost totally uninformed on the proceedings in Moscow. This was a purposeful
attempt to exert his independent use of the atomic bomb in negotiations. He confided to
one aide that “I might tell the President sometime what happened [in Moscow], but I’m
never going to tell those little bastards in the State Department anything about it.”74 It is
possible that Byrnes could have used the aid of the some of the “little bastards,” such as
George Frost Kennan or Charles Bohlen. After the conference (mainly because Byrnes
kept Truman almost as little informed as the State Department) the President lost
73 R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making O f The Hydrogen Bomb, p. 167-168.
74 G. Herken, The Winning Weapon (New York, 1981), p.47-48.
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confidence in his Secretary of State. Byrnes resigned within a year. For the rest of his
presidency, Truman would not again use the bomb for such reckless diplomatic
purposes.
For several years after the war, Groves became a celebrity. The press dubbed him
the “atom general.” But after the McMahon act went into effect, the atomic project
came under civilian jurisdiction. In 1947, Groves had to hand over power to the Atomic
Energy Commission, headed by David Lilienthal. He took an advisory post, but retired
to the business world within a year.

7S

The atomic monopoly so much cherished by

Leslie Groves, was destroyed in 1949 when, contrary to all his predictions, the Soviet
Union exploded an atomic bomb. The atomic “Pax Americana” was gone for good.
Great Britain commenced its own atomic project in 1947. Almost all AngloAmerican collaboration except the Combined Development Trust had broken down.
During this time, the overall relationship between the two countries had reached a low
point. For the next several years, forays into renewed collaboration were contemplated
and discussed, but nothing really came of them.

The result was the detonation o f a

“Hiroshima-style” atomic device in 1952. The importance of this achievement was
overshadowed by the American detonation of the first megaton hydrogen bomb the same
year. Britain’s scientists had done a great bulk o f the theoretical work on atomic energy,
and their fair share of technical work. The evidence suggests that it was foolhardy for
Britain to think that they could become secret partners with the United States, while
Clement Attlee was pontificating on the virtues of internationalism.

75 W. Lawren, The General And The Bomb, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1988) p.264-266.
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Conclusions

Scientific collaboration between the United States and Great Britain, which had
started in earnest in 1943, evaporated in 1946. Even though the United States was soon
to establish strong ties to the countries of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan and
NATO, scientific exchange would not occur again between the two countries for more
than a decade. Not until the Sputnik crisis was the United States ready to entrust its
nuclear technology to the British. Why were nuclear relations a source of contention
after the war? The reasons why Britain and the United States could not scientifically
collaborate in the post-war world lay rooted in the fact that both countries had radically
different views of their future and their past. The simplest reason was that the United
States insisted on maintaining a monopoly of the atomic bomb, even if it meant breaking
its promises o f post-war cooperation with Britain. The United States found itself as the
sole holder o f the most powerful and decisive weapon ever known to the world. It was
seemingly the ultimate bargaining chip. Despite several high-ranking officials who
believed the atomic secret should be under international control, the majority believed
the United States should keep its possession unto itself. Harry Truman, Secretary of
State Byrnes, and nearly the entire American public wanted to believe it could stay that
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way for years. Leslie Groves told them what they wanted to hear and they bought it.
There was no cognition from the public and little from the administration that Great
Britain had made an important contribution to the bomb project. In the face of the
monumental American effort, they were considerably overshadowed.
The British contributed to their own failure by naively trusting in ambiguous
executive agreements, while failing to effectively use their uranium bargaining chips.
The precedents set by Churchill and Roosevelt, at Quebec and Hyde Park, led the British
to feel that their partnership with the United States sat on far firmer footing than it
actually did. What chances they did have were hurt considerably, when Clement Attlee
came to office and brought with him an unresolvable intemationalist-bilateralist
approach to the Washington Conference. There the British wasted time by declaring airy
international principles when they might have been demanding concrete agreements on
scientific exchange. While the passage of the Atomic Energy Act and Groves’ use of the
Clause 102 of the UN Charter was the collaboration’s requiem, British hopes died, when
Leslie Groves won Harry Truman over to his monopolist agenda. The British often
persisted in believing, despite evidence to the contrary, that the United States would give
them the bomb. As the ones who initiated atomic research in 1940 with the Maud
committee, and as the only partner in the Manhattan project they believed that they
earned it. They naively assumed that meaningless paper agreements would open the
doors o f cooperation. Britain, the historically ruthless practitioner of realpolitik, trusted
the United States to do the honorable thing and share American engineering secrets. No
matter how many Anglophiles inhabited the American policy-making bureaucracy, they
were unwilling to subvert the interests of the United States for those o f Great Britain.
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What Great Britain received was a lesson in hardboiled pragmatism. The United States
believed their most valuable ally was the atomic bomb, not the British. By any
definition imaginable, a “special relationship” was not at work in the sphere AngloAmerican nuclear relations. Instead, Great Britain found itself out in the cold.
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PART II
THE PROBLEM OF ANGLO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
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In Washington Lord Halifax
Once whispered to Lord Keynes
I t ’s true they have the money bags
But we have the brains77

This arrogant limerick left behind at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference captures
the attitude of many in Great Britain about the role they would play in the economics of
the post-war world. The United States might have the economic might in the post-war
world, but surely they still needed, and wanted, the financial acumen of Great Britain.
This optimistic attitude prevailed in many of Britain’s leading minds. In their view, Great
Britain was not an ailing ally who was looking for charity. Their partners in war, the
United States, would certainly find it in its best interest to pay back Britain for the many
sacrifices, which it had made for the common cause. America would certainly do its
utmost to help Britain salvage its exhausted economy, if not in gratitude, then in its own
interest in keeping a wise experienced partner. As noted before, during the war, Harold
Macmillan, later the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and like Churchill, bom of
an American mother saw an analog of the Anglo-American relationship in classical times.

77 Richard Gardner “Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy In Current Perspective,” in The ‘Special Relationship ’
edited by Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1986) p. 185.
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“We...are Greeks in this American empire.”78 Certainly Franklin Roosevelt had given
several indications that the United States would repay Britain. At the end o f the war,
Great Britain was looking at a myriad o f problems: staggering sterling debts, an
unfavorable balance of payments and a severely damaged industrial base. In this
predicament, Great Britain looked to its wartime partnership with the United States to
bail it out. However in the two years immediately following the Second World War, it
was clear that the United States was looking at Britain, not as a partner, but as a
supplicant. How did the “special relationship” initially fail in the realm of postwar
economics?
Much like in post-war nuclear relations, Great Britain relied far too heavily on
vague wartime promises made by Franklin Roosevelt about the future policy of the
United States. Britain overestimated its own importance to the United States in the post
war world, while underestimating, and misunderstanding the goals of the American
leadership and the public. Great Britain again tried to secure a firm bilateral partnership,
while the United States was concerned with extracting economic concessions in order to
build the liberal capitalist framework: its model o f the post-war world. In the process of
relentlessly pressing a prostrate Britain into dismantling the economic underpinnings of
its empire, the United States revealed its lack of commitment to a true “special
relationship” with Great Britain in economic affairs.

78 David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill And The Wartime Anglo-America Alliance, 1939-1945: Towards
A New Synthesis” in The ‘Special Relationship ’ edited by Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, p. 35.
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Prelude

For many leaders on both sides of the ocean, the interval between world wars was
a formative time in their views on the world economy. Great Britain had emerged from
the War to End All Wars a bloodied but triumphant power bent on vengeance. Britain
expended a sixth of its national wealth in the First World War, and had become a debtor
country. Britain, along with France, had demanded huge reparations from a defeated
Germany in the hope that it would prevent another European war. In this, they were
disappointed. Britain was arguably the most committed participant in the League of
Nations, only to see it fall into impotence. In finances, Britain had relied on the concept
o f free trade to ensure future prosperity, only to slide into depression. Their reaction to
this depression was to look to empire. Great Britain had instituted a quasi-mercantilisttrading bloc in 1932, with the Ottawa Agreements. These agreements set up the Imperial
Preference System in which Britain heavily favored trade within the British
Commonwealth by universally erecting high tariff walls to outside trade and controlling
sterling convertibility. In this way, Britain was directly or indirectly able to control 40%
o f the world trade by 1938.

TQ

In doing so, Britain was able to maintain a tenuously

favorable balance of payments. This balance o f payments was brittle though. The price
o f total retained imports for Britain in 1939, was L858* million. Great Britain was only
able to pay for these imports with Z,471 million in exports. The rest of the balance came
79 Edward Crapol, “Tightening The Screws: Anglo-American Relations And The Cold War, 1945-1946,”
(unpublished paper, 1977)
* The Sterling-Dollar conversion should be approximated at $4.03 to IT
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mainly from income o f foreign investments and shipping earnings.

sn

The Second World

War hit these two forms o f income hard.
The United States in 1918 was the world’s largest creditor. It then watched in
chagrin, as the bulk o f these debts were defaulted on in the course of war and
depression.81 Out o f the inter-war period came several influential Americans who
believed that American prosperity and world peace could only be guaranteed by the
multilateral controls for trade and finances. These controls would ensure truly free and
vigorous trade, which in turn would ensure peace and prosperity. Foremost among these
individuals was Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who believed that
“unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic
competition, with war.”82 Hull would set the tune that many American officials would
follow in the post-war world.

80 Sir Richard William Barnes Clarke, “Toward A Balance O f Payments: Appendix A ,” (memorandum in
the Overseas Finance division o f the Treasury, May 11, 1945, found in Anglo-American Economic
Collaboration edited by Sir Alec Caimcross, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982)
81 Only Finland was able to pay off its debts to the United States in the 3 0 ’s. The memory o f the massive
defaulting o f payments made many Americans less than eager to lend money abroad.
82 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs O f Cordell Hull, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948) p. 525.
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The Future Deferred

When Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt met at the Atlantic Conference
in August o f 1941, a mutual statement o f views and values was not the main objective.
The conference had been suggested by Roosevelt to consult on Lend-Lease, the details of
which were being worked out in Washington. The Atlantic Charter was a somewhat
unexpected byproduct o f the conference.

There was some pressure on Roosevelt,

particularly from the State Department, to extract some significant concessions on post
war free trade from the British. As could be easily surmised, Hull and the State
Department were vigorously opposed to any resumption of imperial preferences and
closed sterling bloc trade by Great Britain. Many saw the Atlantic Conference as a good
time to press Britain on these issues. The United States had not yet entered the war, and
Britain was still in shock after narrowly averting of a Nazi invasion during the Battle of
Britain.
Churchill, for his part, initially did not wish to spend a great deal o f time on post
war planning. His main concern was getting America into the war. Roosevelt proposed
over dinner that they should draft a declaration “laying down certain broad principles
which should guide our policies along the same road.”

SIA

Churchill met this with an

83 Richard Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins And Prospects O f Our International Order,
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969) p. 40.
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ambiguous draft avoiding specific post-war commitments. This was unacceptable to the
State Department, which responded with a draft that attacked the Imperial Preference
System. In the State Department draft, both countries would “strive to promote mutually
advantageous economic relations between them through the elimination o f any
discrimination in the United States or the United Kingdom against the importation of any
product originating from the other country.” In response to this, the Prime Minister
asserted that if this statement would be held to the Ottawa agreements, it would be his
duty to submit it for approval to Parliament and the Governments o f the Dominions.
This, he advised, would take at least a w eek.85 This ploy worked, and Roosevelt had the
State Department back down. Roosevelt, even more than Churchill, was less than
enamored with post-war planning and did not want to jeopardize the time frame of the
conference. Churchill was allowed to insert the phrase “with due respect to existing
obligations,” which would seem to exempt the Imperial Preference System. This
amended statement became the fourth clause of the charter.

Of.

The clause itself was used

to differing effect in the two countries. In the United States, it was held out as a
declaration of free trade to public opinion, while the British public could interpret it as
respecting the Ottawa agreements.
At the same time the Lend-Lease talks in Washington, in the summer of 1941,
also touched on the question o f the post-war world. The talks began with the arrival in
Washington, of John Maynard Keynes, the legendary British economist. The issue at
question was Article VII in the Lend-Lease agreement. The State Department was

85 Ibid, p. 44-46.
86 Julia Johnsen, The Eight Points o f Post-W ar World Reorganization, (New York: H.W. Wilson Company,
1942) p. 66-67.
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determined to get Britain to agree to a concrete elimination of its closed trading sphere
and inconvertible sterling. In pursuit of this, Hull included Article VII in the Lend-Lease
draft, which pointedly bound the two countries to forswear discrimination against the
other’s products. A provoked British contingent pointed out that Article VII would
seemingly apply to the Imperial Preference System, but not American tariffs. The U.S.
contingent used the time honored American argument, which was that the British
preference system was discriminatory, while tariffs were not.
The issue was apparently finally settled after some informal negotiation between
British Ambassador Lord Halifax and the State Department. What resulted was a rather
slippery clause that committed the signatories “to the elimination of all forms of
discriminatory treatment in international commerce and to the reduction of tariffs and
other trade barriers.”

This statement seemed to eliminate the imperial preference

system. But the clause also asserted that the “elimination o f discrimination would be
determined by agreed action... in the light of governing economic conditions.”

go

What

this action would be, or in what economic conditions, was frankly unclear. The British
cabinet was skeptical enough to hold back on final agreement. This led Roosevelt to
intervene and reassure Churchill. According to Churchill, Roosevelt gave him a definite
assurance that “(the British) were no more committed to the abolition of imperial
preference, than the American Government were committed to the abolition of their high
protective tariffs.”

on

In short, Roosevelt was telling Churchill that the clause was only

87 Crapol, p. 5.
88 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 59.

89 Ibid. p. 65.

64

inserted for form’s sake and was not a binding post-war agreement. This is, in short,
what Churchill told Parliament. Yet it was far from what the State Department or
Congress believed.
Thus in both the Atlantic Charter and in Article VIE of the Lend-Lease agreement,
imprecise language was used to avoid having to work out defined positions on post-war
trade preferences. This imprecise language was interpreted differently by the public of
each country. The confusion was, at the time, beneficial to the British. The United States
had the money and the resources, and most likely could have pressed Britain into explicit
concessions. That, however, was not the spirit Roosevelt wanted to engender. The
confusion was supplemented by an apparent promise by Roosevelt to Churchill, to respect
Britain’s pre-war status quo. Like the personal agreements Churchill would receive from
Roosevelt later, the question not asked was if it would be binding to Roosevelt’s
successors?

A View from the Basement

By the beginning o f 1945, it was apparent that the Allies would be victorious.
The impending end of conflict gave American and British leaders an impetus to examine
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their economic situations. This period also gave the leaders an opportunity to avoid
tackling in a meaningful way the difficult issues o f the immediate post-war world.
When the British leaders crawled out of their figurative bomb shelters and took a
look around, the sight that greeted their eyes was abhorrent. Britain had spent a quarter of
its total wealth in fighting the war. Out of a 1939 figure o f L30 billion, L7.3 billion had
been lost. O f this amount, a good deal (LI .5 billion) was caused by the vast destruction
inflicted by the Luftwaffe and V-weapons. Shipping losses caused another L .7 billion.
But even more harmful to Britain’s post-war prospects was disinvestment of L .9 billion in
internal and L4.2 billion in external investments.90 Dividends and interest from these
investments accounted for almost half of Britain’s pre-war receipts towards balance of
payments. In 1945, it was estimated that Britain’s imports would be L I.25 billion and
total overseas expenditures would be in the neighborhood of L2.9 billion. By contrast
Britain’s exports would be a mere L.35 billion and total overseas income, L.8 billion.91
Great Britain’s total yearly deficit would be a staggering L2.1 billion, or almost 10% o f
their total wealth. At that rate the British economy would soon implode.
The British debt situation possibly looked worse. Great Britain had accumulated
over $25 billion in debt to the United States from materials acquired through LendLease.

Grain, guns and garments sent to Britain during the war were dutifully counted

and charged to Britain. Britain had also acquired a large debt to sterling bloc countries.

90 Ibid P- 178.
91 John Maynard Keynes, “Our Overseas Financial Prospects,” August 13, 1945, C.P. (45) 112, Cab 129/1
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The main reason for the sterling bloc debt was foolish wartime accounting. Great Britain
had frozen the pound-sterling balances held in the City of London for the duration of the
war. When buying supplies from a sterling bloc country* Britain would add to the frozen
accounts instead of sending direct payment. The reason this was ill considered was that
many of these debts were incurred fighting in defense of the very countries they were
buying from. For example, the British added to the Egyptian account for local goods
purchased to supply the British Army fighting the desert campaign against the Nazi
advance on Egypt. Whether or not Egypt wanted the British there in the first place is
irrelevant, these frozen balances ballooned to over L2.1 billion by 1945.93 To put it in
full perspective, Great Britain owed her creditors almost one third o f the pre-war wealth
of the entire British Empire. In addition to all these deficits and debts, Great Britain had
to rebuild its bombed out cities and raise the standard of living for its people, who had
been on strict rationing since 1939. It was estimated that Britain would have to eliminate
or postpone its debts and raise its exports 50-75%, just to maintain its pre-war standard of
living. And indeed, British leaders planned an unprecedented expansion of the social
welfare net. The accounting did not add up.
America on the other hand had pulled itself out of the Great Depression and was
surging ahead. Industrial production had shot up, as did the demand for consumer items
and the exploitation of raw materials. In all, America was turning out an astounding 50%
of the world’s goods and services. While the rest of the major markets in the world
burned, the United States had become almost the only place to shop. This, however, was

93 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 168.
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somewhat paradoxical and self-defeating. If almost every other developed nation was
destroyed, who was going to buy the new deluge o f American products in this new
world? Since the turn o f the century, America had placed enormous emphasis on exports
as a way o f stabilizing the economy and on promoting liberal Open Door policies in other
countries to facilitate exports. Without these exports there was no guarantee that
Americans would live 50% better. The prospect of another post-war depression
frightened many observers. Amid these prospects, one would think that the emphasis
would have been placed on the immediate future. Remarkably, the United States instead
devoted great energies to the construction o f a long-term post-war framework for trade
and financing

Trying to Hijack A New World

The Bretton Woods agreements evolved in great part out of American memories
o f 1919. At that time the United States had refused to play a role in the development of a
post-war world, instead relying on a good deal of laissez-faire trade. Men like Cordell
Hull were determined to not make that mistake a second time. The Bretton Woods talks
were held to form a heretofore-unprecedented collective financial security arrangement.
What was needed was a way to prevent the financial problem of a single nation or several
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nations from setting off an international crisis. The Bretton Woods negotiations were a
largely Anglo-American affair. That is not to say that the British and the Americans had
a unified vision o f what the conference would or should bring about. Keynes negotiated
for the British side. His conception o f the post-war framework was that of a huge
clearinghouse. He envisioned the clearinghouse with $26 billion in assets where
countries could overdraw predetermined limits of money. That money could be used to
stabilize currency, level balances o f payments, and expand their economies through
internal investment. Negotiating for the American side was the somewhat crude, yet
tenacious Department of Treasury deputy, Harry Dexter White. His plan called for a
smaller $5 billion stabilization fund that would mainly work to protect exchange rates.
Keynes’ proposal was unacceptable to America because there would be no evident quotas
on contributions. Thus if the demand for dollars was great (which it was sure to be)
America would find itself forced to contribute the bulk of the fund.94 What the United
States would have been doing then would have been tantamount to a $26 billion grant-inaid to the world. The American delegation knew that this somewhat forced forerunner of
the Marshall Plan would be completely unacceptable to the public.
The compromise was the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a $8.8 billion fund
in which the United States would contribute a maximum of $3.2 billion.95 Both sides
misinterpreted the character of the fund, to conform to their post-war visions. The British
government seemed to believe that its entire IMF lending quota would be made
94David Felix, Keynes: A Critical Life, (London: Greenwood Press, 1999) p. 273-278; Gardner, SterlingD ollar Diplomacy, p. 71-77.
95 David Reynolds and David Dimbleby, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain And America
In The Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1988) p. 179.
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immediately available for withdrawal. In presenting a statement to the House of Lords,
Keynes seemed to believe that L325 million o f IMF money could be added to the British
dollar and gold reserves, and that the quotas to the rest of the sterling area could be added
to this.96 Keynes used that interpretation to elicit the approval o f the House o f Lords.
America believed the exact opposite. Dean Acheson assured the Senate “There is no idea
whatever that a person walks in and goes through the empty formality o f saying ‘I need
this presently to make a payment’... that would be childishly absurd.”

07

Britain believed

that it had a source o f post-war income. America would not let Britain turn a multilateral
framework into a hidden bilateral payment. Much like the Atlantic Charter and Article
VII o f the Lend-Lease negotiations, the Bretton Woods agreements led to confusion over
critical points o f the agreement.

“Equality of Sacrifice”

How was Great Britain to cope with its shattered economy in the post-war period?
In wrestling with this problem, Great Britain began to fall into the trap of believing that

96 The parliamentary debates (Hansard). House o f Lords official report.
(London : H.M.S.O., 1944) 840 (May 23, 1944)

97 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 135.
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Roosevelt’s breezy promises and friendly demeanor with Churchill reflected the thinking
o f the American establishment and public. Britain tried to project a close bilateral
wartime relationship into the post war world.
To Great Britain, Lend-Lease was a godsend. Munitions and provisions flooded
Britain. It is fair to say that the British government accepted Lend-Lease for what it was:
a wartime arrangement. However, by mid-war, the British leadership began to have new
conceptions of what Lend-Lease was. In design, Lend-Lease was supposed to cover two
stages. Stage I encompassed the general war against Germany and Japan and was well
underway. Stage II was to be the period in which Germany had been defeated, but Japan
was still fighting. It was unclear what Britain’s exact role was to be in the Pacific
campaign, or how Lend-Lease would be affected. The phase after the defeat of Japan,
presumably Stage III seemed to be a mystery to all.

AO

The American role in a post-war

world was ambiguous at best. In the absence of any concrete post-war rebuilding plans,
Britain began to look longingly at Lend-Lease as its lifeline.
Subsequently, a new doctrine began to be preached in Britain, the doctrine of
“equality o f sacrifice”. In the view of many an Englishman, it was the United Kingdom
that had saved the United States and not the other way around. In the British view, Hitler
had been an equal threat to both the United States and Great Britain. Britain maintained
that the United States in effect, had been defended by Britain, from Nazi Germany, from
1939-1941 gratis. During that time frame, Britain had exhausted nearly $4 billion of cash
and gold reserves. Most of this had gone directly to the United States through the Cash
and Carry arrangement preceding Lend-Lease. Even after America had entered the war,

98 Ibid. p. 54-56.
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Britain continued to bear the bulk of the burden. In 1942 and 1943, the number o f British
divisions encountering the enemy was 50% higher than the American divisions." It was
not until 1944, that parity was reached. The fact that by the end o f the war America was
doing the vast bulk o f the fighting did not erase the fact that proportionally Britain had
done above her share. Britain had even participated in sending raw materials to the
United States through Reverse Lend-Lease. In the view o f many in Britain, the United
States had profited from Britain’s awful sacrifices. In the mind of the average Briton, the
burden o f post-war construction was on the United States.100 There was thus an
expectation by many within the British public and government, that the United States
would continue Lend-Lease after the war. The hope was that the U.S. would at the very
least let Britain do some funded rebuilding during Phase II. Roosevelt stoked British
expectations, when in his report to Congress on Lend-Lease, he stated “No nation would
grow rich through the war effort of its allies. The money costs o f war will fall according
to the rule of equality o f sacrifice.”101
Exactly what Phase II would be, changed throughout the war. The problem was
that no one really had a good idea of when Japan would be defeated, or how much of a
role Britain would have to play. The expectation was that it would take anywhere from
18 months to two years to defeat Japan, after Germany fell.
Churchill was eager to get answers from Roosevelt on these issues, and eager to
press Britain’s claim. He received his chance during the second Quebec conference in

99 Anglo-American Economic Collaboration edited by Sir Alec Caimcross, p. 24.
100 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 173-176.
101 Ibid p. 167.
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September of 1944. Churchill was at his diplomatic best in facing Roosevelt on these
issues. To demonstrate Britain’s willingness to “earn its keep,” Churchill dutifully
volunteered the use o f British air and naval forces in the fight against Japan, hitherto an
exclusively American naval fight. Churchill calculated that, if Britain expected to stay in
the American public’s good graces, the American public needed to see the Pacific as an
Allied fight, not just an American one. Britain’s effort in Burma had come under attack
by many in the American military as just a defensive maneuver to protect Britain’s India
colony. Some Americans asserted that the acronym for the Southeast Asia Command,
SEAC, actually stood for “Save England’s Asian Colonies.”102 To the chagrin of
Roosevelt’s senior naval advisor FDR accepted Churchill’s offer.103
Having demonstrated a willingness to fight Japan, Churchill moved on to Phase II.
Churchill informed Roosevelt that he hoped that during the war with Japan, Britain would
continue to receive food, shipping, and the like, to continue to cover its needs; Roosevelt
assented. Churchill suggested to the President, that he hoped Lend-Lease would be
continued on a proportional basis for munitions, while non-munitions aid would be
maintained at the present level in order for Britain to begin to rebuild. Churchill also
hoped that the President would assent, even if it meant that British manpower would be
used for civilian purposes. Roosevelt agreed to this, but surprisingly he and his aides
thought it better to put a monetary figure on it, rather than some formula. He thought that

102 Walter LaFeber, “Roosevelt, Churchill And Indochina, 1942-1945,” American Historical Review
(December 1975) p. 1282.
103 Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain And America, 1944-1947, (New York: Columbia
Press, 1981) p. 61 The American Navy believed that it had sufficient strength to defeat Japan. The navy
wanted to avoid the political, military and colonial complications that would result from a large British
effort in the Pacific. They were able to successfully delay the implementation of this promise by Churchill.

73

$3.5 billion in munitions assistance and $3 billion in non-munitions assistance would be
sufficient for Phase II. Roosevelt also agreed to remove restrictions on the British export
trade.104 This seemed to be a firm agreement on Lend-Lease aid from the American
government, at least in Phase II. The monetary commitment by Roosevelt could easily
have been interpreted as money in the bank, regardless of how long or short Phase II
would be. Would this apparent endorsement o f continued Lend-Lease funding mean that
America was ready to use the bilateral Lend-Lease agreement to help rebuild Britain?
This was far from the case.
America as a whole had a far different view o f “equality of sacrifice” than Great
Britain. In many quarters, the view was that America would have eventually triumphed
with or without Great Britain. After the 1942 congressional elections, the Congress took
on a more conservative frame o f mind. Many Republicans and Southern Democrats had
seen Lend-Lease as a big “give-away.” Few Americans were aware that reverse LendLease even existed and most thought that Lend-Lease should only be used for the
immediate prosecution of the war. 83% o f the public in one poll believed that Great
Britain should begin immediate repayment o f Lend-Lease as soon as the war was
completed.105 Most Americans still saw Britain, as they had always perceived it: a
wealthy imperial colossus controlling a quarter of the world’s population.
Many o f Roosevelt’s underlings were equally skeptical of the wisdom of using
Lend-Lease to rebuild Britain. The American Joint Chiefs o f Staff had unanimously held
that Lend-Lease should only be used for immediate prosecution of the war. Cordell Hull

104 The Quebec Conference, 1944, Foreign Relations O f the United States, p. 344-346.
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was furious because Roosevelt had “attached no conditions to it whatever. These were
numerous questions pending between us and Great Britain... the credits would be needed
in our bargaining position with her.”106 Even Henry Stimson objected to a commitment
of Lend-Lease money for British reconstruction. He did not object to aiding Britain in the
post-war world, and in fact advocated that very issue. However, Stimson believed that “if
we were going to make use o f Lend-Lease appropriations in the post-war period when
there was no longer any connection between them and the actual fighting o f the recipient,
we ought to consult Congress.”

107

Roosevelt did not, in fact, have the authority to make

monetary commitments to Britain. It was up to Congress to appropriate the funds. Yet
the memorandum with the Phase II monetary commitments bore the mark “OK FDR.”
Roosevelt’s promises had again concealed a general apathy both in the public and
the administration for the funding o f Britain’s reconstruction. Churchill, however, was to
walk away from the second Quebec conference believing that Britain had a firm
commitment of funds.

106 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs O f Cordell Hull, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948) p. 1618.
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“Which is the justice, which is the thief?”- King Lear

Despite expectations, Phase II lasted for all of three months. The atomic bomb
ended the prospect o f a bloody, protracted invasion of mainland Japan, and with it, the
need for more British troops in the Pacific. In the mean time the unexpected happened:
Roosevelt died and Churchill’s Conservative party was defeated in general elections. All
at once Harry Truman and Clement Attlee headed their respected governments. Much
like in nuclear relations, Attlee and the British were to find that Roosevelt’s wartime
promises did not necessarily bind Truman to follow them. Britain would need new
options for post-war construction.
The first pledge to go was Phase II aid. It was not known if Truman was even
aware o f Roosevelt’s promise o f $6.5 billion to Britain in Lend-Lease. Whatever his
previous knowledge, Truman felt seemingly little compunction about abruptly canceling
Lend-Lease, which he in fact did. On August 21, it was announced that no new orders for
Lend-Lease would be taken and those in the pipeline were to be returned to the United
States.

108

This news hit London like a weight; the government and press reacted

accordingly. Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor o f the Exchequer, wrote, “This very heavy
blow was struck at us without warning, and without discussion. We had expected at least

108 Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership p. 61.
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some tapering off of Lend-Lease over the first few years of peace.” 109 Many in the press
believed that this was a sign o f official disapproval o f the new Labour government, which
had won on a platform of socialist programs. It was widely asserted that Roosevelt would
not have handed Britain such an affront. Churchill, now opposition leader, spoke out
against it in Parliament. The reaction from American papers, having no knowledge of
Roosevelt’s promises was incredulity. One paper characterized the British reaction as
“being mad at your rich uncle, who has been giving you hand-outs, because he died.” 110
One letter to Truman read “Let me congratulate you on putting England in her place.
Give them the old Yankee hard-driven-bargain treatment and you shall earn the affection
and support o f the American people.”111
While Attlee professed that the news was “a bolt from the clear sky,” the Labour
Government should have been reasonably aware. After Roosevelt’s death, ranking
officials in the American government had been sending signals that aid would be
terminated. Keynes had warned that Lend-Lease “will cease almost immediately” upon
the defeat o f Japan. In any case, the British would have look to some other means to
rebuild. The man who was entrusted with planning a new approach was possibly the
most brilliant British economist since David Ricardo.
John Maynard Keynes, 1st Baron of Tilton, had already been proved prophetic
when he correctly predicted that the staggering reparations levied against Germany after
the First World War, would drive that country into economic nationalism and militarism
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in his The Economic Consequences o f the Peace. His espousing o f deficit spending in
The General Theory o f Employment, Interest, and Money gave rise to the concept of
•

Keynesian economics.

119

Keynes was an economic genius who had devoted many of his

years to selfless government service. He was also a pompous, elitist snob; the very
picture o f British arrogance, which many Americans still believed in and detested.
The brilliant Cambridge economist and former member o f the famed Bloomsbury
literary coterie, which included Virginia Woolf, was to be relied upon to perform one
more act of public service for his country. The end of Lend-Lease in light of Britain’s
mounting debts and poor balance o f trade presented the threat, in Keynes’ words, of a
“Financial Dunkirk.”113 In March, Keynes had produced “Overseas Financial Policy in
Stage III” in which he gave three choices for dealing with post-war economic troubles.
Sir Richard Clarke, who was present at the meeting paraphrased Keynes’ choices as
“Austerity,” “Temptation,” and “Justice.”114 “Austerity” would entail complete financial
independence o f the United States. To achieve this Britain would have to institute more
stringent rationing and government controls for three to five years, establish strict
national planning on both imports and exports, and severely limit colonial and overseas
expenditure and activity. “Temptation” was a course for accepting large amounts of
American loans in exchange for accepting all U.S. demands on Britain (i.e. elimination of
imperial preferences, free sterling convertibility, etc.) The third choice was “Justice.”
“Justice” would, in effect, put a call on Roosevelt’s promise that “The money costs will
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fall according to the role o f equality o f sacrifice.” Great Britain would demand $3 billion
on a retroactive Lend-Lease from 1939-1941, plus an option on an additional $5 billion
loan at no to low interest. A certain amount would also be requested from Canada and
the Commonwealth. In exchange for this, Britain would make a certain amount of
sterling (around L I 50 million) liquid and convertible. Keynes favored “Justice”, although
he also favored keeping “Austerity” alive as a backup. “Temptation” would seem to have
been the least favored option. Keynes noted that any o f these options would also have to
be supplemented by an increase in exports and the subsidization o f post-war occupation
duties.115
If there was any question Keynes doubted that America would come through, he
rested them in “The Present Overseas Financial Position of the United Kingdom.” In it
he stated, “...in relation to the vast expenditures of the war the sums involved are a trifle.
In fact it is inconceivable that the people of the United States can be influenced in their
decision, one way or another, by the sum of the money at stake. It cannot be the money
that matters.”116 This was an astoundingly naive statement for someone of Keynes’
stature and experience to make. As optimistic as “Justice” was, Keynes would apparently
become even more Pollyannaish. After the cut-off o f Lend-Lease, the British Cabinet
tapped Keynes to lead a delegation to Washington.

115 Ibid.. p. 53-55.
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All we have done for you, and this is how you repay us!

Keynes and the British team were to find out that his version of Justice was
contradicted by the American sense of it. Again, much as like in nuclear relations, Britain
would find out how non-binding Franklin Roosevelt’s promises would be to the Truman
administration.
If he was optimistic in March, Keynes was even more so preparing to embark to
Washington. The Washington talks were scheduled to open on September 11. Keynes
assured the ministers that he could persuade the Americans to offer a $6 billion grant-inaid. Keynes did not even touch on any strings that would be attached to this free gift.
This certainly was what the Labour Government wanted to hear.117 Keynes even asserted
that he should not be authorized to agree on anything but a grant.118 This optimistic view
was to haunt Keynes. The new Secretary of Treasury Fred Vinson led the American
delegation. Vinson’s deputy was Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Will
Clayton, who was a friend of Keynes, and generally a friend of Britain. Friendship,
however, would play little part in the negotiations. Vinson was a conservative, homespun
Democrat who did not particularly warm to Keynes’ acerbic and cerebral wit. Keynes
opened the negotiations with a rousing speech bemoaning Britain’s post-war plight, and
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the basic tenets of his “Justice” argument. Keynes was soon unceremoniously stripped of
his expectations.
Roosevelt’s vague promises of “equality o f sacrifice” had no relevance to the
situation. The American delegation was looking into the future for several reasons.
Without the Roosevelt modus operandi of putting off a tough issue for a later time, the
American delegation was free to use the loan as a hammer for free trade. In addition, the
British delegation could not be coming as supplicants at a worse time. Without, as yet,
the perceptible threat of a menacing Soviet Union, the opinion o f the American public
and Congress was that domestic issues were far more important than international
problems. Intent on welcoming home the GI’s and “normalcy,” only 7% of Americans
believed that foreign problems were vital.119 There also was the opinion expressed by exPresident Herbert Hoover: if the United States gives Britain free billions, America would
have to do likewise for Russia, China, France, etc. There was in fact also the widespread
popular opinion that the Socialist Labour Government would spend the money on
nationalizing industries and instituting expensive social programs.120 The Labour foreign
policy slogan of “left knows left” also could not have sat well with a great number o f
Americans.
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If “Equality o f Sacrifice” meant anything to the public, it meant the Britain

should be more grateful for America’s Herculean wartime effort. Certainly, Congress as
a whole reflected these views, and Vinson and Clayton knew it. There would be no grant.
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Roosevelt’s promise was just that: Roosevelt’s. He was gone, as was “Equality of
Sacrifice.”
Once stripped of his optimism, Keynes started working for an interest-free loan.
However, he had so thoroughly convinced the Cabinet and Attlee that he could obtain a
grant, that they were initially unwilling to accept a loan. Belatedly Keynes sent London
his opinion on September 26, 1945, that “arguments based on our previous sacrifices
would do no good...”122 This set the tone for what could only be described as grueling
negotiations. The American delegation was firmly grounded in the reality of the situation.
Congress would not approve a grant and Congress would not approve an interest-free
loan. Thus there was no point in even negotiating on these grounds. Keynes’ urbane wit,
as noted, had little effect on Vinson. And Clayton, though sympathetic to the British
cause, was more interested in improving America’s commercial position. In short, the
bureaucracy, though more sympathetic than the general public, still put America’s
interests squarely before Britain’s.
In the process of negotiating what turned out to be a $3.75 billion dollar loan with
2% interest over 50 years, the British had to make several concessions. The British were
obligated to make sterling convertible within a year after the loan was ratified. Making
sterling convertible to dollars would enable sterling bloc countries to more readily buy in
American markets. The accumulated sterling bloc balances proved a little tricky. The
United States wanted the balance released and convertible into dollars so it could be used
to buy American products. However, they realized that in doing so Britain would just be
giving back the dollars secured in the loan. America sought and got an agreement to
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write off the balances. The opening o f the sterling area also mortally wounded the
Imperial Preference System. In future years, it would become untenable. Roosevelt’s
assurance that the United States would not threaten Imperial Preference rang hollow.

19 T

The British were also committed to ratifying the Bretton Woods Agreements. In
return for this, the United States wiped out the British Lend-Lease debt with the exception
o f $650 million of Lend-lease goods in the pipeline. This was probably far below the
goods’ market value.124 All in all, this was a generous settlement. In effect, the British
received a 97% discount on all American goods provided during the war. It was,
however, far closer to “Temptation” than “Justice.” The quick and fuzzy promises that
had often soothed British egos during the war were replaced by cold, hard reality. Just as
in nuclear relations, America was more interested in using multilateral frameworks, like
the Bretton Woods agreements, to enhance the Hegemonie des Etats-Unis, rather than
bilateral agreements with Britain. And, any bilateral agreements America did agree to
were to be in the long-term interests of American hegemony.

122 Henry Butterfield Ryan, The Vision o f Anglo-America: The US-UK Alliance And The Emerging Cold
War, 1943-1946, (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1987) p. 58.
123 The Collected Writings O f John M aynard Keynes, (Cambridge, Cambridge, 1979) p. 627.

124 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplom acy, pg. 208.
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An Era of Bad Feelings

The last step in the loan process, and possibly the most acrimonious, was the
debate that raged over ratification of the loan in London and Washington. This debate
exposed the distrust and bad feelings expressed by the public of both countries.
While Labour controlled the House of Commons, the House of Lords was
controlled by Conservatives, and under the Parliament Act of 1911, could hold up a bill
for two years. John Allse Brooke Simon, First Viscount Simon exclaimed that “I do not
suppose there has ever been a very important international agreement put before
parliament for acceptance in which it was found that conditions aroused in this country
such deep anxiety and widespread distrust.” In the House of Commons, Churchill
declared himself astonished that the United States would charge interest on the loan. The
usually pro-American Economist asserted “It is aggravating to find that our reward for
losing one-quarter of our national wealth in the common cause is to pay tribute for half a
century to those who have been enriched by the war.” A Conservative MP declared that
the agreement was “an economic Munich.” A Labour MP thought the agreement
“niggardly, barbaric and antediluvian.”125 It took a rousing defense in the House of Lords

125 Reynolds and Dimbleby: An Ocean Apart, p. 180.
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by Keynes to get loan through, and the cracking of the Labour party whip on its
backbench members, to ratify i t .126
On the American side, the loan ran into Anglophobia and isolationist sentiment.
Returning America GI’s had to pay more than 2% interest on home loans. There were
questions as to why the British got better treatment?127 “The British loan is not to
provide relief for starving people. It is to provide relief for a decadent empire. My slogan
is ‘Billions for the relief of starving children but not one cent o f American taxpayers’
money for the relief of Empires’” exclaimed Colorado Democratic Senator Edwin
Johnson paraphrasing Charles Pinckney. The United Kingdom had “about $8 billion in
dollar assets lying around in other countries, several billions in dollars in cash now. She
has about $15 billion in gold mines, about $8 billion (of) assets in diamond mines. She is
far from being strapped.” according to Democratic Representative William Barry of New
York. 50% o f Americans in one poll expressed disapproval of the loan against 37% who
approved.

198

•

•

•

■

In short, the public was skeptical o f giving a helping hand to their “partner.”

The loan finally was passed in July, 1946 after months of acrimonious debate. The rift
between America and Britain, however, was made painfully clear.

126 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 226-236.
127 Reynolds and Dimbleby: An Ocean Apart, p. 178.

128 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 236-240.
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Conclusions

Great Britain thought o f itself as a partner with the United States during World
War II and believed this partnership was destined to run into the postwar years.
Roosevelt’s assurances o f postwar respect for the British status quo and promises of post
war financial aid had led them to believe that the United States respected their economic
and security concerns. In the Atlantic Charter, in the Lend -Lease Agreement, and in the
Second Quebec Conference, America seemed to promise Britain the extending of
wartime partnership and privileges to the post-war world.

However, Britain soon found

out that in the first years of the Cold War, America was more interested in constructing a
new global economic sphere of influence, in which it could be a hegemon, than in
providing its wartime ally with bilateral aid. Much as in nuclear relations, the United
States brushed conceptions of past sacrifices and contributions aside. When a loan was
forthcoming, it was at the expense o f the British commercial status quo. The British
contributed to the chilly atmosphere, by taking what in effect had been wartime free
money for granted. Keynes’ certainty that the United States would shower Britain with
post-war money hurt the British in the negotiating room, and in public opinion. The
bitter debate over the loan also proved that there was little sympathy in either country’s
public consciousness, for the other. Thus in the first post-war years, the economic
relationship between the United States and Great Britain was less than “Special.”
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CONCLUSION
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There is nothing so irrelevant as a poor relation.
Harold W ilson'29

Winston Churchill allegedly, and nakedly, had declared that he, and by
implication Great Britain, had nothing to hide from the President o f the United States.
While candidly revealing the extent o f Churchill’s trust in the United States, there has
been a missing ingredient to this anecdote. Was this feeling o f conviviality reciprocated
by the United States towards Churchill, and by extension, Great Britain?
The term “Special Relationship” had been applied to other countries by
academics; Israel, Brazil, West Germany and pre-communist China have all been alleged
to have a “special” relationship with the United States.

1 TO

What is most telling about this

observation, is that in each o f these relationships, the United States was by far the
dominant partner imposing its will on the dependent countries. The United States and
Great Britain had had a complex and compelling relationship for over two centuries. At
the end of the war though, Great Britain was unarguably a “poor relation.” While the
129 David Reynolds, “A ‘special relationship’?: America, Britain and the international order since the
Second World War,” International Affairs, vol. 62 (Winter 1985/1986), p.4.
130 Ibid, p.4; Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled A lly, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978);
John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz, eds., Latin America, The United States And The Inter-American System
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980); Hans w. Gatzke, Germany And The United States: A Special
Relationship? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); Michael H. Hunt, The Making O f A
Special Relationship: The United States And China To 1914, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1983)

Second World War had in many regards brought Anglo-American relations closer than
they had been since colonial times, paradoxically, Great Britain and the United States had
never been farther apart. By the end of the war, the United States was the most powerful
state the world had ever witnessed. Great Britain, by contrast, was slipping into
irrelevancy, while its empire and economy were disintegrating. As time progressed,
Britain more and more resembled the poor relation relying on handouts from its rich
cousin.
The two most important areas o f Anglo-American post-war planning were in the
realms of nuclear planning and economics. The atomic bomb was the only weapon
seemingly capable o f leveling the playing field with the Red Army. Most British leaders
realized that if the United States abandoned Great Britain to its fate in the post-war world,
the atomic bomb would be Britain’s only insurance against Soviet expansion.
Meanwhile, the United States was contemplating an atomic Pax Americana, with its
monopoly of the atomic bomb. In the post-war world, Britain faced huge trade deficits,
crippling debts and a destroyed infrastructure. Britain needed generous and liberal
financial aid terms from the United States, while salvaging its anachronistic prewar
trading bloc, if it was immediately to get back on its feet. The United States, for the sake
of its new world capitalist order, was ready to tear down the very trading bloc that Britain
was counting on, and use aid to its ostensible ally as a sledgehammer to do just that.
As the two most important issues in the Anglo-American relationship, the quality
and quantity of nuclear and economic relations were the determining factors as to whether
the “special relationship” actually existed in the immediate post-war world. During the
war, there was an extraordinary level of cooperation and exchange. A lack of “trust,
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mutual consideration and the ability to treat the other’s requests sympathetically” in these
two realms o f Anglo-American interaction after the war, should indicate that a “special
relationship” did not exist in that time period. Franklin Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill’s relationship personified the wartime Anglo-American relationship. Both
leaders had facilitated the unprecedented wartime exchange of military, economic and
scientific material. This built a foundation of sand for the post-war Anglo-American
relationship. With executive agreements, such as the Quebec Agreement and the Hyde
Park Aide-Memoire, or with oral agreements such as Roosevelt’s reassurances about the
Atlantic Charter’s free trade provision or his promise o f Phase II Lend-Lease aid, the
leaders constructed a false future of cooperation. This foundation o f sand crumbled when
the two leaders passed from the scene.
Influential American policy makers such as Leslie Groves, Jimmy Byrnes, Cordell
Hull and Fred Vinson had their own agendas on the future role o f America. All of these
men intended to shore up the nascent American hegemonic project. Whatever
Anglophilia they might have held was checked when American interests came into play.
Whether it was the quest for a liberal capitalist framework, or an atomic monopoly,
Britain figured in only so far as it could aid the United States. When their interests
contradicted the United States’, British interests were the ones subverted. On Britain’s
part, reminders o f wartime effort fell upon deaf ears. Neither was Britain able to play the
part of Greece to the Rome of the United States, contrary to what Harold Macmillan and a
number o f other British policy makers thought. These misconceptions were aggravated
by other British missteps. Whether it was Clement Attlee’s inability to see that he could
not follow both his desire for international control of the atomic bomb, and Britain’s need
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to form a postwar atomic partnership with the United States, or John Maynard Keynes
overconfidence in forecasting a postwar grant in aid. These contradicting goals and
missteps led to bruised feelings and antipathy on both sides.
Historian Bruce Russett saw a special relationship as originating in the wartime
identity of interests. These mutual interests allegedly created a “We-feeling.” A true
“special relationship” would enable “trust, mutual consideration and the ability to treat
the other’s requests sympathetically.”131 Trust and mutual consideration may have been
the basis for which Roosevelt and Churchill more often than not dealt with each other.
However, this papered over and put off the acrimony that was the result of any
collaboration. In the aftermath of the Second World War, this identity of interests no
longer existed for the United States and Great Britain in either the nuclear or economic
sphere. There was no “We feeling.” So, in point of fact, by that definition, there was no
“Special Relationship.”
Many authors use the term “Special Relationship” as a handy catch phrase to sum
up either the close common heritages and cultures of Great Britain and the United States,
or as the sum of political Anglo-American relations, but they miss the point as to why
Winston Churchill coined the phrase in the first place. The context of Churchill’s usage
of the term “special relationship” in his Fulton, Missouri speech was important.
Churchill was not toasting a successful and intimate partnership. Rather, he was offering
a desperate plea for the United States not to abandon Europe and Great Britain. To do
this he invoked the specter of an “iron curtain” descending over Europe. These were not

131 Bruce Russett, Community And Contention: Britain And America In The Twentieth Century,
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963) p. 27.
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the words o f a partner; these were the desperate words o f a supplicant. Thus, from that
1946-vantage point, Churchill himself could see that the relationship was not yet special.
In fact, in the political vacuum of the postwar world, the relationship was growing further
apart. It would take a cold war to bring it back together.
The transition from hostile feelings to close partners, during the Second World
War, was more illusion than reality. With the relative and absolute strengths of both
countries changing so rapidly, neither the leaders nor public of either country were able
to establish a permanent modus vivendi. Both countries needed longer to digest the
rapid pace of events to create a true “special relationship.” As it was, due to American
avarice and British blunders, in both nuclear and economic relations, the immediate
post-war Anglo-American relationship was a frosty one of secrecy and dependency.
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